Publication: Performance-Based Financing Toolkit
Loading...
Date
2014-02-26
ISSN
Published
2014-02-26
Editor(s)
Abstract
Performance-based financing (PBF) approaches have expanded rapidly in lower-and middle income countries, and especially in Africa. The number of countries has grown from three in 2006 to 32 in 2013. PBF schemes are flourishing and cause considerable demand for technical assistance in executing these health reforms in a rational and accountable manner. Currently there is a lack of knowledge among many health reformers of how to implement performance-based financing pilot projects, and scale them up intelligently. In a context of tremendous demand for solid design and implementation experience and given the rapid expansion of results-based financing (RBF) programs, there is an urgent need to build capacity in designing and implementing PBF programs. As yet there has been little attempt to gather the learning from these experiences together in one volume and, moreover, in a form that serves as a guide to implementers. This toolkit answers the most pressing issues related to the supply-side RBF programs of which PBF forms part.
Link to Data Set
Citation
“Fritsche, György Bèla; Soeters, Robert; Meessen, Bruno. 2014. Performance-Based Financing Toolkit. World Bank Training. © http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17194 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
Associated URLs
Associated content
Other publications in this report series
Journal
Journal Volume
Journal Issue
Related items
Showing items related by metadata.
Publication Performance-Based Financing as a Health System Reform(BioMed Central, 2013-09-29)Performance-based financing is increasingly being applied in a variety of contexts, with the expectation that it can improve the performance of health systems. However, while there is a growing literature on implementation issues and effects on outputs, there has been relatively little focus on interactions between PBF and health systems and how these should be studied. This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap by developing a framework for assessing the interactions between PBF and health systems, focusing on low and middle income countries. In doing so, it elaborates a general framework for monitoring and evaluating health system reforms in general.Publication Impacts of Performance‑Based Financing on Health System Performance(BMC Medicine, 2023-10-10)Health systems’ weakness remains one of the primary obstacles towards achieving universal access to quality healthcare in low-income settings. Performance-based financing (PBF) programs have been increasingly used to increase access to quality care in LMICs. However, evidence on the impacts of these programs remains fragmented and inconclusive. We analyze the health system impacts of the PBF program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the largest such programs introduced in LMICs to date. We used a health systems perspective to analyze the benefits of PBF relative to unconditional financing of health facilities. Fifty-eight health zones in six provinces were randomly assigned to either a control group (28 zones) in which facilities received unconditional transfers or to a PBF program (30 zones) that started at the end of 2016. Follow-up data collection took place in 2021–2022 and included health facility assessments, health worker interviews, direct observations of consultations and deliveries, patient exit interviews, and household surveys. Using multivariate regression models, we estimated the impact of the program on 55 outcomes in seven health system domains: structural quality, technical process quality, non-technical process quality, service fees, facility management, providers’ satisfaction, and service coverage. We used random-effects meta-analysis to generate pooled average estimates within each domain. The PBF program improved the structural quality of health facilities by 4 percentage points (ppts) (95% CI 0.01–0.08), technical process quality by 5 ppts (0.03–0.07), and non-technical process by 2 ppts (0–0.04). PBF also increased coverage of priority health services by 3 ppts (0.02–0.04). Improvements were also observed for facility management (9 ppts, 0.04–0.15), service fee policies, and users’ satisfaction with service affordability (14 ppts, 0.07–0.20). Service fees and health workers’ satisfaction were not affected by the program. The results suggest that well-designed PBF programs can lead to improvements in most health systems domains relative to comparable unconditional financing. However, the large persisting gaps suggest that additional changes, such as allocating more resources to the health system and reforming the human resources for health management, will be necessary in DRC to achieve the ambitious global universal health coverage and mortality goals.Publication Transferring the Purchasing Role from International to National Organizations During the Scale-Up Phase of Performance-Based Financing in Cameroon(Taylor and Francis, 2017-04-13)The World Bank and the government of Cameroon launched a performance-based financing (PBF) program in Cameroon in 2011. To ensure its rapid implementation, the performance purchasing role was sub-contracted to a consultancy firm and a nongovernmental organization, both international. However, since the early stage, it was agreed upon that this role would later be transferred to a national entity. This explanatory case study aims at analyzing the process of this transfer using Dolowitz and Marsh's framework. We performed a document review and interviews with various stakeholders (n = 33) and then conducted thematic analysis of interview recordings. Sustainability, ownership, and integration of the PBF intervention into the health system emerged as the main reasons for the transfer. The different aspects of transfer from international entities to a national body consisted of (1) the decision-making power, (2) the “soft” elements (e.g., ideas, expertise), and (3) the “hard” elements (e.g., computers, vehicles). Factors facilitating the transfer included the fact that it was planned from the start and the modification of the legal status of the national organization that became responsible for strategic purchasing. Other factors hindered the transfer, such as the lack of a legal act clarifying the conditions of the transfer and the lack of post-transition support agreements. The Cameroonian experience suggests that key components of a successful transfer of PBF functions from international to national organizations may include clear guidelines, co-ownership and planning of the transition by all parties, and post-transition support to new actors.Publication Performance-based Financing in the Health Sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2022-10)The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa, by area. The country has a long history of conflict, political upheaval, and instability and has a very high poverty rate despite its abundance of natural resources. Mortality and fertility rates in DRC are among the highest in the world. The Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Result Project (PDSS – Le Projet de Développement du Système de Santé) was launched in 2015 with the objective of improving utilization and quality of maternal and child health services in eleven provinces of out of the provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The main component of the project is the implementation of a provider payment system reform through Performance-Based Financing (PBF), launched in the end of 2016. Contracted health facilities receive quarterly payments conditional on the volumes of targeted services provided and on quality of care. The objective of this impact evaluation is to assess whether the PBF approach impacts utilization and quality of primary health services, in comparison to equivalent amounts of unconditional financing. The rational for comparing outcomes produced by facilities implementing PBF to those produced by facilities who receive equivalent amounts of unconditional financing is to isolate the impact of the PBF incentive mechanisms from the direct impact of the additional resources received through the program.Publication Alignment of Performance-Based Financing in Health with the Government Budget(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-08)Performance-based financing (PBF) is the transfer of funds to health facilities so they can provide a pre-agreed set of services according to appropriate standards of quality and administration. These initiatives have introduced a wide set of reforms, including in provider autonomy, access to financial services, flexibility on the utilization of funds, a performance orientation on the budget allocation, and rigorous verification protocols. This tends to set PBF apart from the prevailing public financial management (PFM) systems that often remain input-based and thereby create a sustainability challenge. If the prevailing PFM system remains in parallel to the PBF, countries are likely to return to the legacy PFM system once PBF donor resources dry up. This paper unpacks this problem. It develops a conceptual framework about how to think about aligning PBF principles with PFM structures; offers a set of diagnostic questions for an assessment; and helps guide an analyst through the process of developing a reform roadmap, considering country context. The paper also proposes a reform roadmap to be centered around the following four facility financing pillars: (i) provider autonomy, (ii) financial management capacity, (iii) output-oriented budget provisions, and (iv) a unified payment system. As a discussion paper, this work aims to solicit feedback on the proposed approach from the PBF and PFM community.
Users also downloaded
Showing related downloaded files
Publication Government Matters III : Governance Indicators for 1996-2002(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-08)The authors present estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The authors assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. They present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of previous research work on indicators initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat 1999a,b and 2002). The authors also address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors.Publication Design Thinking for Social Innovation(2010-07)Designers have traditionally focused on enchancing the look and functionality of products.Publication Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy(Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003)Most wars are now civil wars. Even though international wars attract enormous global attention, they have become infrequent and brief. Civil wars usually attract less attention, but they have become increasingly common and typically go on for years. This report argues that civil war is now an important issue for development. War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles. Where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war. The global incidence of civil war is high because the international community has done little to avert it. Inertia is rooted in two beliefs: that we can safely 'let them fight it out among themselves' and that 'nothing can be done' because civil war is driven by ancestral ethnic and religious hatreds. The purpose of this report is to challenge these beliefs.Publication Governance Matters VIII : Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008(2009-06-01)This paper reports on the 2009 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2008: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. The authors also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. They find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. The aggregate indicators, together with the disaggregated underlying indicators, are available at www.govindicators.org.Publication Governance Matters IV : Governance Indicators for 1996-2004(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-06)The authors present the latest update of their aggregate governance indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these measures. The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 organizations. The authors present estimates of the six dimensions of governance for each period, as well as margins of error capturing the range of likely values for each country. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, the authors give examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. The authors also analyze in detail changes over time in their estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While the authors find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), they also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, they interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low-income countries.