Publication: Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete Abatement : Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade
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Date
2013-04-02
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0095-0696
Published
2013-04-02
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This paper provides a first analysis of a “policy bloc” of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy, faces a (non-policy) fringe of other fuel importers, and an exporter bloc, and purchases offset from the fringe. We compare a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade scheme for the policy bloc, in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap, since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger. Offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate, while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price. The domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small. When the policy bloc is larger, the offset price can be higher under a cap. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower.
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Publication Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete Abatement : Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade(2011-06-01)This paper provides a first analysis of optimal offset policies by a "policy bloc" of fossil fuel importers implementing a climate policy, facing a (non-policy) fringe of other importers, and a bloc of fuel exporters. The policy bloc uses either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, jointly with a fully efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is then shown to prefer a tax over a cap-and-trade scheme, since 1) a tax extracts more rent as fuel exporters reduce the export price, and more so when the policy bloc is larger relative to the fringe; and 2) offsets are more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is half the tax rate; under a cap-and-trade scheme the quota and offset price are equal. The domestic carbon and offset price are both higher under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme when the policy bloc is small; when it is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap-and-trade scheme. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, and more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower, and since the price obtained when selling offsets is often higher (always so for a large fringe).Publication Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents : Taxes Versus Quantities(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-10)This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a "fringe" of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered by both the strategic importer and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria are examined under the four combinations of trade policies and compared with the corresponding static games where climate damages are given (not stock-related). The main results are that taxes always dominate quota policies for both the strategic importer and exporter and that "fringe"countries bene?t from a tax policy as compared with a quota policy for the strategic importer, as the import fuel price then is lower, and the strategic importer's fuel consumption is also lower, thus causing fewer climate damages.Publication Carbon Offsets with Endogenous Environmental Policy(2010-05-01)Interests in obtaining carbon offsets in host countries for Clean Development Mechanism projects may serve as an obstacle to implementing more stringent general environmental policies in the same countries. A relatively lax environmental policy, whereby carbon emissions remain high, can be advantageous for such countries as it leaves them with a higher than otherwise scope for future emissions reductions through Clean Development Mechanism and other offset projects. In this note, the potential to affect the availability of future Clean Development Mechanism projects is shown to distort environmental and energy policies of Clean Development Mechanism host countries in two ways. Measures to reduce use of fossil energy are weakened. Because this weakens private sector incentives to switch to lower-carbon technology through Clean Development Mechanism projects, host governments then also find it attractive to subsidize this switch, in order to maximize the country s advantage from the Clean Development Mechanism.Publication Emissions Trading with Offset Markets and Free Quota Allocations(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2012-11)This paper studies interactions between a "policy bloc's" emissions quota market and an offset market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol). Policy-bloc firms enjoy free quota allocations, updated according to either past emissions or past outputs. Both overall abatement and the allocation of given abatement between the policy bloc and the fringe are then inefficient. 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Developing countries ought to be able to keep their own tax revenue, and additional compensation to them for the economic burdens of these carbon charges may be warranted. Such compensation would constitute at most 40 percent of the raised global revenue. Implementing these charges can be a challenge, especially for aviation, where a large number of bilateral air-service agreements would need to be rewritten.
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