Person:
Strand, Jon

Development Research Group, World Bank

Fields of Specialization

environmental economics; energy economics; economics of climate change

Departments

Development Research Group, World Bank

Last updated: January 31, 2023

Biography

Jon Strand, a Norwegian national, is Extended Term Consultant in the Development Research Group in the World Bank, where he covers environmental and energy economics, focusing on climate-related issues. He also holds a chair as professor of economics, University of Oslo. Main recent topics for research have been non-market valuation; natural resource and energy issues for developing countries; and environmental policy including environmental taxation and climate policy. He has consulted the OECD, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Norwegian government agencies on environmental policy matters. During 2005-2008, he served as the IMF’s environmental economist.

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 42

Prospects for Markets for Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes under the Paris Agreement
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2022-05) Strand, Jon
The Paris Agreement provides for parties to use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes in implementing their Nationally Determined Contributions. This paper analyzes forward trading of these outcomes in the presence of two forms of uncertainty: (1) uncertainty about the fulfillment of Nationally Determined Contribution targets, and (2) uncertainty about the existence and functioning of the forward, options, and future spot markets markets for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. When parties can sell and buy internationally transferred mitigation outcomes forward, access to call options for late purchases leads to correspondingly larger forward sales, or less current mitigation. Access to put options for late internationally transferred mitigation outcome sales does not affect forward trading outcomes but increases late sales for net sellers. Access to options markets is welfare enhancing for all parties, and call options help parties stay in compliance with their Nationally Determined Contributions at the Paris Agreement end point, 2030. The existence of internationally transferred mitigation outcome markets may be in peril, however, as banking beyond 2030 is not allowed. The availability and functioning of internationally transferred mitigation outcome markets can be enabled or improved by increased climate finance provided by donors. With no options markets, host countries will still sell internationally transferred mitigation outcomes forward, albeit less so, and rely on access to more expensive “backstop” mitigation for ex-post compliance with their Nationally Determined Contributions. Closed-form solutions are derived for trading and its welfare impacts in all the option contract alternatives, given that parties’ uncertainties about fulfilling their commitments are uniformly distributed. The welfare impact of the availability of put and call option contracts is then strongly increasing in uncertainty, and in ex-post and forward outcome prices.
Incentivizing Carbon Taxation in Low-Income Countries: Tax Rebating versus Carbon Crediting
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-06) Strand, Jon
Border carbon adjustments imply that high-income countries set taxes on energy-intensive imports that are proportional to the carbon content of these imports, to match their own carbon taxes. This paper considers the impacts of such a policy on exporter countries, many of which have no or very low carbon taxes today. The paper first studies a policy whereby the importer allows the exporter’s border tax to be reduced by its own comprehensive carbon tax (“tax rebating”). The analysis finds that the exporter is then incentivized to set its own comprehensive carbon tax at the same rate as the border tax, up to a maximal rate. When the border tax is higher, the exporter instead reduces its carbon tax. Border tax revenues of the high-income country can be returned to incentivize higher carbon taxes in the exporting countries (“carbon crediting”). When tax rebating is not allowed but tax revenues are fully returned, even higher exporter carbon taxes can then be incentivized, possibly exceeding $60 per ton of carbon dioxide in the numerical examples. Border taxation can give rise to export diversion away from border tax-setting countries, which reduces the scope for incentivizing the exporter’s carbon tax. The paper also studies how taxes on oil extraction by oil exporters can be incentivized by oil importing countries, by increasing their oil import prices above world market rates, or more efficiently through support to investments in exporters’ renewable energy capacity.
Supporting Carbon Tax Implementation in Developing Countries through Results-Based Payments for Emissions Reductions
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020-10) Strand, Jon
This paper discusses compensation mechanisms to strengthen incentives for lower-income countries to adopt carbon taxes through donor-funded support programs. The paper considers two cases: the provision of climate finance when the host country uses the additional mitigation to meet its own greenhouse gas mitigation target (the "incremental cost price"); and a transaction in an international carbon market with the mitigation credit created by host country mitigation transferred outside the country (the “opportunity cost price”). Both offset the host country's deadweight loss from imposing a carbon tax, which is lower when the host country enjoys large co-benefits from mitigation. Formulas are derived for the incremental cost price and the opportunity cost price. The opportunity cost price is always larger than the incremental cost price, as the host country under the opportunity cost price must use additional, more expensive mitigation policies to reach its mitigation target. The paper discusses additional costs and barriers that deter hosts from adopting carbon taxes. These arguments can help to explain why few low-income countries have so far adopted carbon taxes, and why the necessary compensation for tax adoption may exceed theoretical assessments.
Transformational Climate Finance: Donors' Willingness to Support Deep and Transformational Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions in Lower-Income Countries
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020-05) Strand, Jon
This paper uses simple analytical models to study high-income donor countries' willingness to pay to supply mitigation finance to low-income countries; how this depends on modality for finance supply; and how it changes as the global greenhouse gas mitigation agenda moves forward. The paper focuses on two modalities: transformational project-based mitigation finance (transitioning from fossil to non-fossil energy use at scale), and transformational policy-based mitigation finance support (implementing comprehensive carbon taxation). These modalities are compared with conventional finance for which donors have lower willingness to pay. High-income countries' willingness to pay is higher when mitigation is combined with carbon taxation; private-sector finance is also more highly incentivized. Reaching the transformational mitigation finance stage can be challenging, as it may require large provision of mitigation finance with negative net returns to high-income countries. Willingness to pay will be higher when high-income countries collaborate in the provision of mitigation finance. The findings show that more effective collaboration can be sustained when it is enforced by an international financial institution that collects and spends the provided mitigation finance to induce efficient mitigation activity in low-income countries and collaboration among donors is enforced by simple tit-for-tat reaction strategies.
Climate Finance, Carbon Market Mechanisms and Finance "Blending" as Instruments to Support NDC Achievement under the Paris Agreement
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-06) Strand, Jon
This paper considers the impacts of "finance blending" whereby climate finance is added to international carbon markets for offset trading. The paper first discusses climate finance and the carbon market as free-standing finance solutions by high-income countries to increase mitigation in low-income countries. Climate finance solutions have advantages for high-income countries due to their greater flexibility and general efficiency. A favorable aspect of well-functioning offset markets is that all participating countries face a similar and robust carbon price. With finance blending and "all attribution to the carbon market," the market equilibrium is inefficient, as mitigation is excessive in low-income countries and too low in high-income countries. Instead, mitigation outcomes in the offset market should be attributed to the two finance types in proportion to their finance shares provided to the low-income countries through this market. When climate finance is added to the carbon market, the ambition level for emissions reductions for donor countries should be raised equivalently; otherwise, the added climate finance leads to no increase in global mitigation. When low-income country market participants have limited access to credit markets, climate finance can increase mitigation by supplying the capital required to implement efficient mitigation projects.
International Willingness to Pay for the Protection of the Amazon Rainforest
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-03) Siikamaki, Juha V.; Krupnick, Alan; Strand, Jon; Vincent, Jeffrey R.
The Amazon rainforest, the world's largest tropical rainforest and an important constituent of the global biosphere, continues degrading by rapid deforestation, which is expected to continue despite policies to prevent it. Current international funding to protect the Amazon rainforest focuses on benefits from reduced carbon emissions. This paper examines an additional rationale for Amazon protection: the valuation of its biodiversity and forests as natural heritage to the international community. To measure the economic value of this benefit, the paper examines U.S. and Canadian households' willingness to pay to help finance Amazon rainforest protection. The analysis finds that mean willingness to pay to avoid forest losses projected to occur by 2050 despite current protective policies is $92 per household per year. Aggregating across all households and considering the area protected, the analysis finds that preserving the Amazon rainforest is worth $3,168 per hectare (95-percent confidence interval $1,580-$4,756), on average, to households in the United States and Canada. Considering households in other developed countries would generate yet larger estimates of aggregate value, likely comparable to the carbon benefits from rainforest protection. The results reveal high values of the Amazon rainforest to people geographically distanced from it, lending support to international efforts to reduce deforestation in the Amazon.
Assessment of Net Mitigation in the Context of International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Mechanisms
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-03) Strand, Jon
This paper discusses the scope for market mechanisms, already established for greenhouse gas mitigation in Annex 1 countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for implementing "net mitigation," defined here as mitigation beyond Annex 1 countries' formal mitigation requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. Such market mechanisms could be useful for establishing and extending greenhouse gas mitigation targets also under the Paris Agreement from December 2015. Net mitigation is considered in two possible forms: as a "net atmospheric benefit," or as an “own contribution” by offset host countries. A main conclusion is that a “net atmospheric benefit” is possible at least in the short run, best implemented via stricter baselines against which offsets are credited; but it can also take the form of offset discounting whereby offset buyers are credited fewer credits. The latter, although generally inefficient, can be a second-best response to certain imperfections in the offset market, which are discussed in the paper. There is less merit for claiming that "own contributions" can lead to additional mitigation under existing mechanisms.
Modeling the Marginal Value of Rainforest Losses: A Dynamic Value Function Approach
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-10) Strand, Jon
A rainforest can be modeled as a dynamic asset subject to various risks, including risk of fire. Any small part of the forest can be in one of two states: either untouched by forest fire, or already damaged by fire, in which case there is both a local forest loss and increased dryness over a broader area. In this paper, two Bellman equations are constructed, one for unharmed forest and a second for already burnt forest. The analysis solves the two equations for the total expected asset values in each of the two states, assuming that asset returns have a constant growth rate over time. The equations are used for deriving the marginal value of standing (unburnt) rainforest, equivalent to the expected discounted value loss when losing a small additional forest patch. The paper shows that marginal forest value is increased by the additional dryness and forest fire risk that follow from forest fragmentation when additional forest is lost locally. Both forest fires and dryness here serve as “multipliers” to the basic services return loss, within and outside the forest. The paper also presents a framework for calibrating the impact of the forest fire risk component on forest value.
Value of Improved Information about Forest Protection Values, with Application to Rainforest Valuation
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-09) Siddiqui, Sauleh; Strand, Jon
What is the utility from obtaining more precise values of natural resource objects (rainforests), through surveys or other similar information gathering? In the value of information problems studied here, a principal who wishes to preserve a resource sets a price to offer to a seller without knowing precisely the protection value or opportunity value, to the seller. The value of information related to more precise information about the protection value for the principal is a key issue in environmental and natural resource valuation, but it is in most cases implicit and not analyzed. More precise resource values reduce the frequency of two types of mistakes (saving the resource when it should not be saved, and not saving the resource when it should be saved), and increases the principal’s ex ante expected utility value. This paper applies the model to Amazon rainforest protection and considers the hypothetical value of perfect information. The analysis finds that the value of perfect information can easily exceed realistic information costs, thus perhaps justifying significant expenditures for valuation studies, given that all available information is used efficiently for conservation decision purposes. The value of perfect information also depends on the nature of buyer-seller interactions, and is higher in the altruistic case, where the principal has full concern for the outcome for the seller.
Energy Intensive Infrastructure Investments with Retrofits in Continuous Time: Effects of Uncertainty on Energy Use and Carbon Emissions
(Elsevier, 2015-03-31) Framstad, Nils Chr.; Strand, Jon
Energy-intensive infrastructure may tie up fossil energy use and carbon emissions for a long time after investment, and thus be crucial for the ability to control long-run emissions. Much or most of the resulting carbon emissions can often be eliminated later, through a retrofit that may however be costly. This paper studies the joint decision to invest in such infrastructure, and retrofit it later, given that future climate damages are uncertain and follow a geometric Brownian motion process with positive drift. We find that higher climate cost volatility (for given unconditional expected costs) then delays the retrofit decision by increasing the option value of waiting to invest. The initial infrastructure is also chosen with higher energy intensity, further increasing total emissions, when volatility is higher. We provide conditions under which higher climate cost volatility increases total expected discounted climate damage from the infrastructure, which happens in a wide set of circumstances.