Publication: (Un)bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supply and Sewage Projects
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Published
2011
ISSN
09571787
Date
2012-03-30
Author(s)
Estache, Antonio
Editor(s)
Abstract
Public infrastructure has long been faced with difficulty in financing. Available public resources are often limited in many countries. Competitive bidding in public procurement systems is an important instrument to contain the public investment costs. But competition is often limited in the infrastructure sector. In such circumstances, better public procurement design can save a lot of public resources. There is a general tradeoff between the competition effect and economies of scale and scope; large contracts can benefit from the scale and scope effects but have to compromise competition. The unbundling approach can foster competition but may suffer from diseconomies of scale and scope. Using procurement data from water supply and sewage projects in developing countries, the paper analyzes the effects of the (un)bundling strategy on bidders' entry and bidding behavior. It shows that the bidder cost structure exhibits significant diseconomies of scope between two main public works in this sector, i.e., treatment plant construction and distribution network installation. There is no clear evidence of the competition effect. Therefore, there is no rationale of bundling these two works into a single contract. Unbundling can help governments to contain public infrastructure costs.
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Publication (Un)bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supply and Sewage Projects(2009-03-01)Competition in public procurement auctions in the water supply and sanitation sector is largely limited. This is partly because of high technical complexity and partly because of auction design flaws. The division of lot contracts is an important policy choice for auctioneers to achieve efficiency. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Larger works could benefit from economies of scale and scope, but large contracts might undermine competition. Using data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, this paper shows that bidder entry is crucially endogenous, especially because it is determined by the auctioneer's bundling and unbundling strategy. If water treatment plant and distribution network works are bundled in a single lot package, competition would be significantly reduced, and this adverse entry effect would in turn raise the public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the bidder cost structure. It is important to account for the underlying cost structure for designing efficient auction mechanisms.Publication Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America(2009)Introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water and sewerage sectors is difficult and controversial. Empirical studies on its effects are scant and generally inconclusive. Case studies tend to find improvements following privatisation, but they suffer from selection bias and it is difficult to generalise their results. To explore empirically the effects of private sector participation on coverage, we assemble a new dataset of connections to water and sewerage services at the city and province level based on household surveys in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. The household surveys, conducted over a number of years, allow us to compile data before and after the introduction of private sector participation as well as from similar (control) regions did not privatise. Our analysis reveals that, in general, the share of households connected to piped water and sewerage improved following the introduction of private sector participation, consistent with the case study literature. We also find, however, that the share of households connected similarly improved in the control regions, suggesting that private sector participation, per se, may not have been responsible for those improvements. Results are similar when looking only at the poorest households. The share of poor households connected to piped water and sewerage increased similarly in areas both with and without private sector participation, suggesting that--in terms of connections at least--private sector participation did not harm the poor.Publication Heterogeneity in the Cost Structure of Water and Sanitation Services : A Cross-Country Comparison of Conditions for Scale Economies(2010)The main purpose of this article is to compare the cost structure of water utilities across a set of 14 countries with different levels of economic development. As far as is known, the cross-country perspective is novel in this literature. This article first provides new measures of returns to scale in the water and sanitation sector for a set of countries, most of them from the developing world. It is then shown that the probability of a utility operating under decreasing, constant, or increasing returns to scale depends not only on its characteristics (the volume of water produced in particular), but also on the country's level of economic development (gross national income) and business environment as measured by investor protection, the cost of enforcing contracts and perceptions of corruption.Publication The Challenge of Improving Water and Sanitation Services in Less Developed Countries(2008)This paper argues that there are many challenges to designing and implementing water and sanitation interventions that actually deliver economic benefits to the households in developing countries. Perhaps most critical to successful water and sanitation investments is to discover and implement forms of service and payment mechanisms that will render the improvements worthwhile for those who must pay for them. In this paper, we argue that, in many cases, the conventional network technologies of water supply and sanitation will fail this test, and that poor households need alternative, non-network technologies. However, it will not necessarily be the case that specific non-network improved water supply and/or sanitation technologies will always be seen as worthwhile by those who must pay for them. We argue that there is no easy panacea to resolve this situation. For any intervention, the outcome is likely to be context-dependent. An intervention that works well in one locality may fail miserably in another. For any given technology, the outcome will depend on economic and social conditions, including how it is implemented, by whom, and often on the extent to which complementary behavioral, institutional and organizational changes also occur. For this reason, we warn against excessive generalization: one cannot, in our view, say that one intervention yields a rate of return of x% while another yields a return of y%, because the economic returns are likely to vary with local circumstances. More important is to identify the circumstances under which an intervention is more or less likely to succeed. Also for this reason, when we analyze a few selected water and sanitation interventions, we employ a probabilistic rather than a deterministic analysis to emphasize that real world outcomes are likely to vary substantially.Publication Procurement in Infrastructure : What Does Theory Tell Us?(2009-07-01)Infrastructure has particular challenges in public procurement, because it is highly complex and customized and often requires economic, political and social considerations from a long time horizon. To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. The paper provides a minimum package of important economic theories that could guide governments to wise decision-making at each stage. Theory suggests that in general it would be a good option to contract out infrastructure to the private sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such as fixed-price contracts. However, this holds under certain conditions. Theory also shows that ownership should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or objective of infrastructure provision. Public and private ownership have different advantages and can deal with different problems. It is also shown that it would be a better option to integrate more than one public task (for example, investment and operation) into the same ownership, whether public or private, if they exhibit positive externalities.
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