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Iimi, Atsushi

Transport Global Practice
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Industrial organization, Development economics
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Transport Global Practice
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Last updated January 31, 2023
Biography
Atsushi Iimi is a Senior Economist in the Transport Global Practice of the World Bank where he specializes in development economics related to the Bank’s transport operations in Africa. He joined the World Bank in 2006 after earning a Ph.D. in economics from Brown University. Before joining the Bank, he also worked at IMF and JICA/OEFC, Japan. His research interests include spatial analysis, rural accessibility, evaluation of transport and energy projects, growth and public expenditure. His research on these topics has been published in scholarly journals, such as the Review of Industrial Economics, Journal of Urban Economics, Journal of Applied Economics, the Development Economies, and IMF Staff Papers.
Citations 9 Scopus

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 63
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    Impact Evaluation of Free-of-charge CFL Bulb Distribution in Ethiopia
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-03) Costolanski, Peter ; Elahi, Raihan ; Iimi, Atsushi ; Kitchlu, Rahul
    Electricity infrastructure is one of the most important development challenges in Africa. While more resources are clearly needed to invest in new capacities, it is also important to promote energy efficiency and manage the increasing demand for power. This paper evaluates one of the recent energy-efficiency programs in Ethiopia, which distributed 350,000 compact fluorescent lamp bulbs free of charge. The impact related to this first phase is estimated at about 45 to 50 kilowatt hours per customer per month, or about 13.3 megawatts of energy savings in total. The overall impact of the compact fluorescent lamp bulb programs, thanks to which more than 5 million bulbs were distributed, could be significantly larger. The paper also finds that the majority of the program beneficiaries were low-volume customers -- mostly from among the poor -- although the program was not targeted. In addition, the analysis determines the distributional effect of the program: the energy savings relative to the underlying energy consumption were larger for the poor. The evidence also supports a rebound effect. About 20 percent of the initial energy savings disappeared within 18 months of the program's completion.
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    Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects : Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-06) Iimi, Atsushi
    Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only prices but also other nonmonetary aspects need to be taken into account. Multidimensional auctions are often used to evaluate multidimensional bids. This paper examines the bidding strategy in multidimensional auctions, using data from public energy service company projects in Japan. It shows that multidimensional auctions work well, as theory predicts. The competition effect is significant. In addition, strategic information disclosure, including walk-through and preannouncement of reserve prices, can also promote energy savings and investment. Risk sharing arrangements are critical in the energy service company market. In particular, the public sector should take regulatory risk.
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    Price Structure and Network Externalities in the Telecommunications Industry : Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-04) Iimi, Atsushi
    Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost.
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    Infrastructure and Trade Preferences for the Livestock Sector : Empirical Evidence from the Beef Industry in Africa
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-04) Iimi, Atsushi
    Trade preferences are expected to facilitate global market integration and offer the potential for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction for developing countries. But those preferences do not always guarantee sustainable external competitiveness to beneficiary countries and may risk discouraging their efforts to improve underlying productivity. This paper examines the EU beef import market where several African countries have been granted preferential treatment. The estimation results suggest that profitability improvement achieved by countries under the Cotonou protocol compares unfavorably with the returns to nonbeneficiary countries in recent years. Rather, it shows that public infrastructure, such as paved roads, has an important role in lowering production costs and thus increasing external competitiveness and market shares.
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    What is Missing Between Agricultural Growth and Infrastructure Development? Cases of Coffee and Dairy in Africa
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-11) Iimi, Atsushi ; Smith, James Wilson
    Although it is commonly believed that aggregate economic growth must be associated with public infrastructure stocks, the possible infrastructure needs and effects are different from industry to industry. The agriculture sector is typical. Various infrastructures would affect agriculture growth differently depending on the type of commodity. This paper finds that a general transport network is essential to promote coffee and cocoa production, perhaps along with irrigation facilities, depending on local rainfall. Conversely, along with the transport network, the dairy industry necessitates rural water supply services as well. In some African countries, a 1 percent improvement in these key aspects of infrastructure could raise GDP by about 0.1-0.4 percent, and by possibly by several percent in some cases.
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    Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-07) Estache, Antonio ; Iimi, Atsushi
    Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs.
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    Multidimensionality and Renegotiation : Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-07) Estache, Antonio ; Guasch, Jose-Luis ; Iimi, Atsushi ; Trujillo, Lourdes
    Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.
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    Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-07) Estache, Antonio ; Iimi, Atsushi
    To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive.
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    Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders?
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-07) Estache, Antonio ; Iimi, Atsushi
    Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency.
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    Estimating Global Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Projects : Applications in India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-09) Iimi, Atsushi
    The world is faced with considerable risk and uncertainty about climate change. Particular attention has been paid increasingly to hydropower generation in recent years because it is renewable energy. However, hydropower is among the most vulnerable industries to changes in global and regional climate. This paper aims to examine the possibility of applying a simple vector autoregressive model to forecast future hydrological series and evaluate the resulting impact on hydropower projects. Three projects are considered - in India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. The results are still tentative in terms of both methodology and implications; but the analysis shows that the calibrated dynamic forecasts of hydrological series are much different from the conventional reference points in the 90 percent dependable year. The paper also finds that hydrological discharges tend to increase with rainfall and decrease with temperature. The rainy season would likely have higher water levels, but in the lean season water resources would become even more limited. The amount of energy generated would be affected to a certain extent, but the project viability may not change so much. Comparing the three cases, it is suggested that having larger installed capacity and some storage capacity might be useful to accommodate future hydrological series and seasonality. A broader assessment will be called for at the project preparation stage.