Publication:
Implementing a Framework for Managing Fiscal Commitments from Public Private Partnerships

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2014
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2016-09-12
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This note presents practical guidance on how to implement a framework for managing fiscal commitments from Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). It draws on specific regional operational experience and on World Bank Institute (WBI)'s wider thematic engagement with different partners worldwide. The note provides practical advice on how to: consistently identify and assess fiscal commitments arising from PPPs during project preparation and implementation; incorporate these into the project approval process, including budgeting for these appropriately; and strengthen the monitoring and reporting of fiscal commitments over the lifetime of the project. It explains the fiscal commitments that can arise from PPP projects; why governments may find it difficult to assess and manage these fiscal commitments and incorporate them into project selection; and the key components of an institutional framework to manage fiscal commitments at both the development and implementation stages of a project, including the roles, responsibilities, and processes for managing PPP fiscal commitments.
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World Bank; International Finance Corporation; World Bank Institute; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 2014. Implementing a Framework for Managing Fiscal Commitments from Public Private Partnerships. © World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25032 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
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