Publication: Is US Trade Policy Reshaping Global Supply Chains ?
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2023-11-01
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2023-11-01
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Abstract
This paper examines the reshaping of supply chains using detailed US 10-digit import data (tariff-line level) between 2017 and 2022. The results show that while US-China decoupling in bilateral trade is real, supply chains remain intertwined with China. Over the period, China’s share of US imports fell from 22 to 16 percent. The paper shows that the decline is due to US tariffs. US imports from China are being replaced with imports from large developing countries with revealed comparative advantage in a product. Countries replacing China tend to be deeply integrated into China’s supply chains and are experiencing faster import growth from China, especially in strategic industries. Put differently, to displace China on the export side, countries must embrace China’s supply chains. Within products, the reorientation of trade is consistent with a “China + 1” strategy, as opposed to diversified sourcing across multiple countries. There is some evidence of nearshoring, but it is exclusive to border nations, and there is no consistent evidence of reshoring. Despite the significant reshaping, China remained the top supplier of imported goods to the US in 2022.
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“Freund, Caroline; Mulabdic, Alen; Ruta, Michele. 2023. Is US Trade Policy Reshaping Global Supply Chains ?. Policy Research Working Papers; 10593. © World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/40558 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
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