Publication:
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia

dc.contributor.authorFreinkman, Lev
dc.contributor.authorPlekhanov, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:34:21Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:34:21Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractThe paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development.en
dc.identifier.citationWorld Development
dc.identifier.issn0305750X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748
dc.language.isoEN
dc.relation.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.subjectIntergovernmental Relations
dc.subjectFederalism
dc.subjectSecession H770
dc.subjectSocialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250
dc.subjectSocialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350
dc.subjectRegional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110
dc.titleFiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russiaen
dc.title.alternativeWorld Developmenten
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum746
okr.journal.nbpages503-512
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.region.countryRussian Federation
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.05.010
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1102064&site=ehost-live
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/386/description#description
okr.volume37
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