Publication: Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
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Date
2009
ISSN
0305750X
Published
2009
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The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development.
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Publication Fiscal Decentralization and the Quality of Public Services in Russian Regions(2010)The paper provides empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the quality of public services in the Russian regions. The analysis suggests that fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on the key inputs into secondary education, such as schools, computers, or availability of pre-schooling, but has a significant positive effect on average examination results, controlling for the key observable inputs and regional government spending on education. Decentralization also has a positive impact on the quality of municipal utilities provision. Both effects can be attributed to strengthened fiscal incentives rather than to superior productive efficiency of municipal governments.Publication Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe(2009)The majority of the literature on fiscal decentralization has tended to stress that the greater capacity of decentralized governments to tailor policies to local preferences and to be innovative in the provision of policies and public services, the greater the potential for economic efficiency and growth. There is, however, little empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. In this paper we examine, using a panel data approach with dynamic effects, the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralization and economic growth rates across 16 Central and Eastern European countries over the 1990-2004 period. Our findings suggest that, contrary to the majority view, there is a significant negative relationship between two out of three fiscal decentralization indicators included in the analysis and economic growth. However, the use of different time lags allows us to nuance this negative view and show that long-term effects vary depending on the type of decentralization undertaken in each of the countries considered. While expenditure at and transfers to sub-national tiers of government are negatively correlated with economic growth, taxes assigned at the sub-national level evolve from having a significantly negative to a significantly positive correlation with the national growth rate. This supports the view that sub-national governments with their own revenue source respond better to local demands and promote greater economic efficiency.Publication Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth : Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-09)Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meant to provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local capital. Second, retention of taxes raised locally is meant to establish incentives for subnational governmental authorities to foster endemic economic growth as a way of promoting local tax bases. But in the Russian Federation, fiscally autonomous regions have often resisted market-oriented reforms, the enactment of rules protecting private property, and the dismantling of price controls and barriers to trade. The authors find statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that fiscal incentives of the Russian regions represent an important determinant of regional economic performance. The authors also seek to understand the conditions under which fiscal autonomy prompts regional growth and recovery, and the conditions under which it has adverse economic effects. They argue that the presence of "unearned" income streams-particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government-has turned regions dependent on these income sources into "rentier" regions. As such, governments in these regions have used local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms (natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises) from market forces. Using new fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996-99, the authors test this central hypothesis in both single- and simultaneous-equation specifications. Their results indicate that tax retention (as a proxy for fiscal autonomy) has a positive effect on the cumulative output recovery of regions since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But they also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase.Publication What Determines the Extent of Fiscal Decentralization? The Russian Paradox(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-09)The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of fiscal decentralization within Russian regions in 1994-2001. The conventional view that more decentralized governments are found in regions and countries with higher income, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher levels of democracy is not supported by the data. This motivates a more refined analysis of the determinants of decentralization that points to the link between decentralization and the structure of regional government revenue: access to windfall revenues leads to a more centralized governance structure. The degree of decentralization also depends positively on the level of urbanization and regional size and negatively on income and general regional development indicators such as the education level.Publication The Impact of Decentralization on Subnational Government Fiscal Slack in Indonesia(2009-07)Since Indonesia began implementing its decentralization program in 2001, subnational unspent balances have grown rapidly and have reached levels that many officials find unreasonably high. But the extent to which subnational government reserves are excessive, in general, is not obvious. A not implausible decrease in the price of oil would reduce transfers to subnationals significantly and, if sustained, could possibly eliminate reserves in a relatively short time. Central government should not take any immediate action to reduce subnational slack resources directly but should instead focus on removing the underlying causes of such.
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