Publication: Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America
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Date
2008
ISSN
01677187
Published
2008
Author(s)
Straub, Stephane
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Abstract
High rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model to attract private participation in infrastructure in developing countries. After extending in reduced form a standard regulation model, in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts, we use a unique data set of 307 concessions awarded in Latin America from 1989 to 2000, covering the sectors of transport and water, to analyze the determinants of this high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts. We look in details at the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. We then derive some policy implications of our work.
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Publication Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-04)The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work.Publication Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America(2009)Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.Publication Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure : Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-10)The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. They test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, finding broad support for our predictions.Publication Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America(2009)Multidimensional auctions are a natural, practical solution when governments pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, multi-criteria auctions seem difficult to implement and vulnerable to corruption and opportunistic behavior of both parties involved. Using data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the paper examines the probability of renegotiation in connection with the selected award criteria. It shows that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. But more renegotiations would likely happen when the multidimensional format is used. Good governance, particularly regulatory quality and anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.Publication Explaining Enterprise Performance in Developing Countries with Business Climate Survey Data(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008-12)This paper surveys the recent literature which examines the impact of business climate variables on productivity and growth in developing countries using enterprise surveys. Comparable enterprise surveys today cover some 70,000 firms in over 100 countries around the world. The literature that has analyzed this data provides evidence that a good business climate drives growth by encouraging investment and higher productivity. Various infrastructure, finance, security, competition and regulation variables have been shown to significantly impact firm performance. Section 1 of this paper outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the investment climate literature. Section 2 describes the available datasets and surveys the key findings of the empirical literature, first macroeconomic and then microeconomic studies. Particular attention is paid to the robustness of the reported results. Section 3 highlights important econometric issues common to this literature and suggests a research agenda and possible improvements in survey design.
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