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Motivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance

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dc.contributor.authorCordella, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorCordella, Tito
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-08T17:06:37Z
dc.date.available2018-02-08T17:06:37Z
dc.date.issued2017-01
dc.description.abstractMonitoring technologies and pay for performance (PFP) contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents’ motivations vary and so the effectiveness of monitoring technologies. In such a set-up, it shows that: (i) monitoring technologies should be introduced only if agents’ motivations are poor; (ii) optimal PFP contracts are non-linear/non-monotonic in agents’ motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents’ motivations and monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are motivated, complements otherwise; (iv) if the agents’ “type” is private information, the more and less motivated agents could be separated through a menu of PFP/non-PFP contracts, designed in a way that only the less motivated ones choose the PFP.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/29339
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/29339
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.subjectPAY FOR PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
dc.subjectASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectMOTIVATIONS
dc.subjectOPTIMAL CONTRACTS
dc.titleMotivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performanceen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.associatedcontenthttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116302451 Journal website (version of record)en
okr.associatedcontenthttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20608 Working paper version (pre-print)en
okr.crossref.titleMotivations, Monitoring Technologies, and Pay for Performance
okr.date.disclosure2019-10-31
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Journal Article
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.guid897081523894080457
okr.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.016
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/29339
okr.identifier.report125331
okr.journal.nbpages236-55
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Public Sector Management and Reform
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Public Sector Economics
okr.unitDevelopment Economics (DEC)
okr.volume133
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