Publication:
Microfinance Games

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dc.contributor.authorGine, Xavier
dc.contributor.authorKarlan, Dean
dc.contributor.authorMorduch, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:34:30Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:34:30Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractMicrofinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse.en
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
dc.identifier.issn19457782
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/5778
dc.language.isoEN
dc.relation.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.subjectAsymmetric and Private Information D820
dc.subjectBanks
dc.subjectOther Depository Institutions
dc.subjectMicro Finance Institutions
dc.subjectMortgages G210
dc.subjectCapital Budgeting
dc.subjectFixed Investment and Inventory Studies G310
dc.subjectEconomic Development: Financial Markets
dc.subjectSaving and Capital Investment
dc.subjectCorporate Finance and Governance O160
dc.titleMicrofinance Gamesen
dc.title.alternativeAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economicsen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum789
okr.journal.nbpages60-95
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.region.countryPeru
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1105790&site=ehost-live
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/
okr.volume2
relation.isAuthorOfPublication460a3e9c-f7d0-5335-977a-578f6fc8ebe3
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery460a3e9c-f7d0-5335-977a-578f6fc8ebe3
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