Publication:
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism

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dc.contributor.authorKeefer, Philip
dc.contributor.authorVlaicu, Razvan
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:28:48Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:28:48Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractDespite having adopted the political institutions of established democracies, democratizing countries display a systematically different pattern of fiscal outcomes. This article attributes these differences to the low credibility of electoral promises in new democracies. We study a model of electoral competition where candidates have two costly means to make themselves credible: spending resources to communicate directly with voters and exploiting preexisting patron-client networks. The costs of building credibility are endogenous and lead to higher targeted transfers and corruption and lower public good provision. The analysis demonstrates that in low-credibility states, political appeals to patron-client networks may be welfare enhancing, but in the long run, they delay political development by discouraging direct appeals to voters that are essential for credible mass-based political parties. The model explains why public investment and corruption are higher in younger democracies and why democratizing reforms had greater success in Victorian England than in the Dominican Republic.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
dc.identifier.issn87566222
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4611
dc.language.isoEN
dc.relation.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.subjectModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720
dc.subjectNetwork Formation and Analysis: Theory D850
dc.titleDemocracy, Credibility, and Clientelismen
dc.title.alternativeJournal of Law, Economics, and Organizationen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum1004
okr.journal.nbpages371-406
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1000331&site=ehost-live
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://jleo.oxfordjournals.org
okr.volume24
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