Publication:
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship?

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dc.contributor.authorWorld Bank
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-13T14:02:44Z
dc.date.available2012-08-13T14:02:44Z
dc.date.issued2011-01
dc.description.abstractThe level of shareholders' expertise and experience needs to be questioned as they wield greater clout and become more deeply involved in strategic issues that should be the board's purview. This misdirected involvement distracts shareholders from their principal and most important role: electing and overseeing boards. To play that role, shareholders must have the basic tools from soliciting proxies of holders of voting securities to having the ability to seek court relief for a company's oppressive conduct. One of the important principles of good governance is the empowerment of shareholders. Unless they are able and willing to hold boards to account, then there is little hope, short of tough and intrusive regulation, of ensuring that company management acts in anything other than their own narrow self-interest. But the question is: how far should shareholders go? Peter Dey's paper brings an important perspective of someone who is both committed to good governance and experienced as a corporate director. This report heralded a new era of increased attention to the responsibilities of Canadian boards as stewards of shareholder value. Internationally, the author has been associated with the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) for the last ten years and has been an active participant in the Global Corporate Governance Forum, serving as a chairman.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14499021/more-power-shareholders-undermine-board-stewardship
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/11067
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/11067
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPrivate Sector Opinion; No. 20
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACQUISITION
dc.subjectACQUISITIONS
dc.subjectAGENCY COST
dc.subjectAGENCY COSTS
dc.subjectALLEGIANCE
dc.subjectASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectBANKS
dc.subjectBENEFICIARIES
dc.subjectBOARD MEETINGS
dc.subjectBUSINESS COMMUNITY
dc.subjectBUSINESS CORPORATION
dc.subjectBUSINESS CORPORATION LAWS
dc.subjectCAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subjectCEO
dc.subjectCHAIRMAN AND CEO
dc.subjectCOMMON LAW
dc.subjectCOMPANY
dc.subjectCONFLICTS OF INTEREST
dc.subjectCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
dc.subjectCORPORATE BOARD
dc.subjectCORPORATE DECISION
dc.subjectCORPORATE DIRECTOR
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
dc.subjectCORPORATE PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectCORPORATION
dc.subjectCORPORATIONS
dc.subjectCOST OF CAPITAL
dc.subjectCOST REDUCTION
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDECISION-MAKING
dc.subjectDECISION-MAKING PROCESS
dc.subjectDERIVATIVE
dc.subjectDERIVATIVE ACTION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectEMERGING MARKETS
dc.subjectEMERGING-MARKET
dc.subjectEXECUTION
dc.subjectFINANCE CORPORATION
dc.subjectFINANCIAL CRISIS
dc.subjectFIRMS
dc.subjectFUND MANAGER
dc.subjectGLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectGLOBAL PRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectGOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectGOOD GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE GUIDELINES
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE ISSUES
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE PRACTICES
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE SYSTEM
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT AGENCIES
dc.subjectHOLDING
dc.subjectHOLDINGS
dc.subjectINDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
dc.subjectINDIVIDUALS
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL FINANCE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO
dc.subjectINTERNATIONALIZATION
dc.subjectINVESTEE COMPANIES
dc.subjectINVESTIGATION
dc.subjectINVESTING
dc.subjectINVESTMENT BANKING
dc.subjectINVESTOR INTEREST
dc.subjectISSUANCE
dc.subjectLEGAL AUTHORITY
dc.subjectLEGAL FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectLEGAL RIGHTS
dc.subjectLIMITED
dc.subjectLISTED COMPANIES
dc.subjectLOCAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectMAJORITY VOTING
dc.subjectMARKET CAPITALIZATION
dc.subjectMARKET DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectMARKET PRICE
dc.subjectMERGERS
dc.subjectNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectOUTSOURCING
dc.subjectPENSION
dc.subjectPENSION REFORM
dc.subjectPORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
dc.subjectPORTFOLIOS
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectREGULATOR
dc.subjectREGULATORS
dc.subjectREGULATORY FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectREGULATORY STRUCTURES
dc.subjectRISK MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectSECURITIES
dc.subjectSEES
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER ADVOCATE
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER APPROVAL
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER MEETING
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER VALUE
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER VOTE
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDERS
dc.subjectSOCIETY
dc.subjectSTAKEHOLDERS
dc.subjectSTOCK EXCHANGE
dc.subjectSTOCK EXCHANGES
dc.subjectSTOCK MARKET
dc.subjectSTOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION
dc.subjectSTOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectSUBSIDIARY
dc.subjectTRUST FUND
dc.titleDoes More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship?en
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.date.disclosure2011-07-04
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-29T10:00:52.371965Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Brief
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14499021/more-power-shareholders-undermine-board-stewardship
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeTrade and Competitiveness
okr.guid264351468159918163
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000386194_20110704052946
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum14499021
okr.identifier.report62995
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/07/04/000386194_20110704052946/Rendered/PDF/629950BRI0Does00Box0361496B0PUBLIC0.pdfen
okr.topicLaw and Development::Corporate Law
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development::Microfinance
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development::Debt Markets
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Emerging Markets
okr.unitCorporate Governance Forum (CSBGF)
okr.volume1 of 1
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