Publication: Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited
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Date
2008
ISSN
14747456
Published
2008
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Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs on farm products continue to provide an incomplete indication of the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in national markets. As well, in developing countries especially, non-agricultural policies indirectly impact on agricultural and food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy measures including import or export taxes, subsidies, and quantitative restrictions plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the practical methodological issues that need to be faced when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981-2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide CGE model of the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets of the project's measured distortions globally as of 2004.
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Publication Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-04)Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs on farm products continue to provide an incomplete indication of the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in national markets. Especially in developing countries, non-agricultural policies indirectly impact agricultural and food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy measures including import or export taxes, subsidies and quantitative restrictions, plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the practical methodological issues that need to be faced when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981 to 2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model of the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets of the project's measured distortions globally as of 2004.Publication Methodology for Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-01)This paper outlines the methodological issues associated with the task of measuring that actual delivered direct protection or taxation to individual agricultural industries, as well as the direct protection or anti-protection to non-agricultural sectors. It begins with a guide to what elements in principle could be measured. There are two key purposes of the distortion estimates being generated by this project are: 1) to provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly and indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and high-income countries, and hence for the world as a whole; and 2) to attribute the price distortion estimates for each farm product to specific border or domestic policy measures, so they can serve as inputs into various types of partial and general equilibrium economic models for estimating the effects of those various policies on such things as national and international agricultural markets, farm value added, income inequality, poverty, and national, regional and global welfare.Publication Agricultural Distortion Patterns since the 1950s(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-05)This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?Publication Distortions to Agricultural versus Nonagricultural Producer Incentives(2009)For more than a century, government policies have grossly distorted resource use in agriculture, both within and between countries. Earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies reduce national and global economic welfare and inhibit economic growth; they also add to inequality and poverty in developing countries. Since the 1980s, however, numerous developing and some high-income country governments have reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions. This paper draws on new empirical studies to show the changing extent of policy distortions to prices faced by the world's farmers since the 1950s. Modeling results provide an indication of how far those reforms proceeded between the early 1980s and 2004 and of how much scope remains for removing continuing inefficiencies in global agricultural resource use.Publication Annual Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Europe's Transition Economies(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-08)This working paper summarizes annual estimates of covered product Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRAs), for each of the focus economies of Europe's transition economies, their key distortion indicators defined in Anderson et al. (2008), and provides some summary statistics for the region's estimates. Four tables are provided for each country: (a) the NRA to individual farm products covered in the study and their weighted average, using as weights production valued at undistorted prices; (b) the RRA to producers of agricultural tradable, again using as weights production valued at undistorted prices, and the component parts of the RRA calculation; (c) the weights themselves for individual covered farm products and for the residual non-covered group of products, shown as percentages and so they sum to 100 percent; and (d) the trade status of each covered product each year. The NRA in the case of a product having just its output price distorted by government policies is the percentage by which the domestic producer price exceeds the price that would prevail under free markets, that is, the border price appropriately adjusted to account for differences in product quality, transport costs, processing costs, etc. A negative value indicates the domestic price is below that comparable border price.
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