Publication:
Dysfunctional Finance : Positive Shocks and Negative Outcomes

dc.contributor.authorHoff, Karla
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:34:50Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:34:50Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractn financial markets with asymmetric information about mean returns, borrowers with different default risks may pay the same rate of interest. If they do, the marginal borrower will have a high-risk, negative-value project. Under some conditions, technological change that increases each entrepreneur's output will attract a new set of negative-value projects. This adverse selection process will erode the ability rents of the inframarginal borrowers. I present an example in which it destroys the market. The results imply that a boom in a sector can lead to a crisis if institutional change to solve the screening problem does not occur.en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Globalization and Development
dc.identifier.issn19481837
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/5848
dc.language.isoEN
dc.relation.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.subjectAsymmetric and Private Information D820
dc.subjectBanks
dc.subjectOther Depository Institutions
dc.subjectMicro Finance Institutions
dc.subjectMortgages G210
dc.subjectFinancing Policy
dc.subjectFinancial Risk and Risk Management
dc.subjectCapital and Ownership Structure G320
dc.subjectEntrepreneurship L260
dc.titleDysfunctional Finance : Positive Shocks and Negative Outcomesen
dc.title.alternativeJournal of Globalization and Developmenten
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum904
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1152526&site=ehost-live
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://www.bepress.com/jgd/
okr.volume1
Files