Publication: Algeria Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Accelerating Reforms to Protect the Algerian Economy
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2021-03-31
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2021-03-31
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This Algeria Economic Monitor provides an update on key recent economic developments and policies. It places them in a longer-term and global context and assesses the implications these developments and changes in policies have on the outlook for Algeria. This Monitor’s coverageranges from the macro-economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Algeria. The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 presents the country’s macroeconomic developments in 2020 and early 2021. Chapter 2 presents the short- to medium-term outlook for the Algerian economy. Chapter 3 details the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on inequality in Algeria based on evidence across the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Finally, Chapter 4 looks at the key challenges in the country’s health sector as the COVID-19 pandemic eases. The cut-off date for data and forecasting is June 11, 2021.
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“World Bank. 2021. Algeria Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: Accelerating Reforms to Protect the Algerian Economy. © World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36014 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
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