Publication: Hedging under Counterparty Credit Uncertainty
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Date
2008
ISSN
02707314
Published
2008
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This study investigates optimal production and hedging decisions for firms facing price risk that can be hedged with vulnerable contracts, i.e., exposed to nonhedgeable endogenous counterparty credit risk. When vulnerable forward contracts are the only hedging instruments available, the firm's optimal level of production is lower than without credit risk. Under plausible conditions on the stochastic dependence between the commodity price and the counterparty's assets, the firm does not sell its entire production on the vulnerable forward market. When options on forward contracts are also available, the optimal hedging strategy requires a long put position. This provides a new rationale for the hedging role of options in the over-the-counter markets exposed to counterparty credit risk.
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