Publication: Four Critiques of the Redistribution Hypothesis : An Assessment
Abstract
The reformulation of the median voter hypothesis and its testing proposed in has been criticized from four different perspectives. The critiques are discussed and assessed.
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Publication Recognition, Redistribution, and Liberty(2010)This paper examines the relationship between redistribution, recognition, and liberty. In particular, it critiques the existing approaches in the critical literature that either reduces redistribution to a simple subset of recognition, or insists that recognition is both necessary and sufficient for redistribution to occur. It argues, instead, that the introduction of the relatively weak assumption of (minimal) individual liberty is required for recognition, and that while recognition is necessary, it is insufficient for redistribution. It also considers the sustainability of voluntary redistribution in a liberal society, and voluntary recognition in an authoritarian society. Finally, the approach is applied to the problems of discrimination, genocide, and ethnic conflict.Publication Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition(2010)We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that in the postcommunist countries, more frequent changes in power in the early years of transition are associated with better governance in the later years. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that more frequent turnover in power lowers the returns to firms seeking to buy political influence: i.e,. that government turnover serves as a restraint on investing in influence regardless of the ideology of the government.Publication Four Critiques of the Redistribution Hypothesis : An Assessment(2009-12-01)This paper discusses and assesses critiques of the aurhor's reformulation of the median voter hypothesis and its testing. The author rephrases and redefines more correctly the redistribution hypothesis and clarifies its relationship with the median voter hypothesis. He also reviews four types of critiques leveled at his approach.Publication African Patrimonialism in Historical Perspective: Assessing Decentralized and Privatized Tax Administration(2011)One of the most important political legacies of colonialism in Africa has been the reliance on the model of centralized bureaucratic administration, which has had disastrous consequences for African state-building. Like the colonial systems before them, these centralized bureaucracies have not functioned effectively. One of the main problems is a loose coupling between the formal bureaucratic structure of these states and the informal patrimonial elements, mainly patronage, that came to permeate them. Many scholars thus referred to these states as neopatrimonial. Over the past two to three decades, many governments have begun to replace centralized bureaucracies with different forms of partially patrimonial systems, including various forms of decentralization and partial privatization. This article uses both Weber and contemporary agency theory to evaluate the success of these new forms of partially patrimonial administration and to suggest ways in which they could be made more effective.Publication Rules of Redistribution and Foreign Aid: A Proposal for a Change in the Rules Governing Eligibility for Foreign Aid(2008)When income is redistributed at national level, the minimum requirement is that the transfers should be progressive, that is flow from richer to poorer individuals. The same rule should hold at the global level: it is not sufficient that transfers be from a richer to a poorer country. But normally we do not know who are the taxpayers who finance international aid nor who are the beneficiaries of aid. We can nevertheless establish the rules such that the likelihood of a globally regressive transfer is minimized. This implies taking into account countries' national income distributions: penalizing countries with highly unequal distributions since there exists a non-trivial probability that the transfers may be received by people richer than rich countries' taxpayers. Some rules for changing eligibility criteria for aid are proposed.
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