Publication: Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda
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Published
2014-12-12
ISSN
0167-6296
Date
2015-02-09
Author(s)
Bautista-Arredondo, Sergio
Kwan, Ada
de Dieu Bizimana, Jean
Binagwaho, Agnès
Condo, Jeanine
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Abstract
Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a pay for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. Using a prospective quasi-experimental design, this study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing. We find a positive impact of pay for performance on HIV testing among married individuals (10.2 percentage points increase). Paying for performance also increased testing by both partners by 14.7 percentage point among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is an AIDS patient.
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Publication Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-02)Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a paying for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. This study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing and counseling and using data from a prospective quasi-experimental design. The study finds a positive impact of paying for performance with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is stronger for married individuals: 10.2 percentage points. The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive.Publication Impact of Implementing Performance-Based Financing on Childhood Malnutrition in Rwanda(BioMed Central, 2014-11-04)Malnutrition remains a serious concern in Rwanda, particularly among children under-5 years. Performance-based financing (PBF), an innovative health systems financing strategy, has been implemented at the national level since 2008. This study aimed to assess the impact of PBF and other factors associated with the prevalence of three classifications of malnutrition (stunting, wasting and underweight) in children under-5 years in Rwanda. The study is a cross-sectional study comprising of 713 children under five years old from 557 households, whose anthropometric measurements (height, weight and age) had been obtained as part of the 2008 Rwanda General Health and HIV household survey. Z-scores for height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height, and body mass index-for-age were analyzed according to the World Health Organization 2006 Child Growth Standards. Random intercept logistic regression models were used to regress each anthropometric measure (WAZ, HAZ and WHZ) against child, maternal and household characteristics.Publication Long-Run Effects of Temporary Incentives on Medical Care Productivity(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-06)The adoption of new clinical practice patterns by medical care providers is often challenging, even when the patterns are believed to be efficacious and profitable. This paper uses a randomized field experiment to examine the effects of temporary financial incentives paid to medical care clinics for the initiation of prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy. The rate of early initiation of prenatal care was 34 percent higher in the treatment group than in the control group while the incentives were being paid, and this effect persisted at least 15 months and likely 24 months or more after the incentives ended. These results are consistent with a model where the incentives enable providers to address the fixed costs of overcoming organizational inertia in innovation, and suggest that temporary incentives may be effective at motivating improvements in long-run provider performance at a substantially lower cost than permanent incentives.Publication Using Performance Incentives to Improve Health Outcomes(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-06)This study examines the effect of performance incentives for health care providers to provide more and higher quality care in Rwanda on child health outcomes. The authors find that the incentives had a large and significant effect on the weight-for-age of children 0-11 months and on the height-for-age of children 24-49 months. They attribute this improvement to increases in the use and quality of prenatal and postnatal care. Consistent with theory, They find larger effects of incentives on services where monetary rewards and the marginal return to effort are higher. The also find that incentives reduced the gap between provider knowledge and practice of appropriate clinical procedures by 20 percent, implying a large gain in efficiency. Finally, they find evidence of a strong complementarity between performance incentives and provider skill.Publication Paying Primary Health Care Centers for Performance in Rwanda(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010-01)Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.
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