Publication: The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None?
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Date
2010
ISSN
00220388
Published
2010
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Aggregate indexes of the quality of governance, covering large samples of countries, have become popular in comparative political analysis. Few studies examine the validity or reliability of these indexes. To partially fill this gap, this study uses factor, confirmatory factor and path analysis to test both measurement and causal models of the six Worldwide Governance indicators. They purportedly measure distinct concepts of control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, rule quality, political stability, and voice and accountability. Rather than distinguishing among aspects of the quality of governance, we find that they appear to be measuring the same broad concept.
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Publication Response to 'What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?'(2010)Thomas (2009) dismisses the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as an 'elaborate and unsupported hypothesis' because of the failure to demonstrate the 'construct validity' of these indicators. We argue that 'construct validity' is not a useful tool to assess the merits of the WGI, and even if it were, Thomas provides no evidence of any practical consequences of failure to meet the criteria of construct validity.Publication Income Shocks and Corruption in Africa : Does a Virtuous Cycle Exist?(2011)Empirical evidence suggests that governance quality is a key driver of economic growth and that, in turn, higher incomes might have a positive causal effect on the quality of governance. Such complementarity could invite virtuous cycles of development. Using a measure of corruption as our proxy for the quality of governance, and rainfall as an instrument for income, we explore this issue and find evidence to the contrary. For a panel of African countries, positive income shocks on average tend to invite extra corruption. Closer inspection, however, reveals that this result can be attributed to the most corrupt countries. Conversely, countries with a sufficiently low level of corruption can escape the detrimental effect of income booms on corruption and may actually experience a virtuous cycle of development.Publication African Patrimonialism in Historical Perspective: Assessing Decentralized and Privatized Tax Administration(2011)One of the most important political legacies of colonialism in Africa has been the reliance on the model of centralized bureaucratic administration, which has had disastrous consequences for African state-building. Like the colonial systems before them, these centralized bureaucracies have not functioned effectively. One of the main problems is a loose coupling between the formal bureaucratic structure of these states and the informal patrimonial elements, mainly patronage, that came to permeate them. Many scholars thus referred to these states as neopatrimonial. Over the past two to three decades, many governments have begun to replace centralized bureaucracies with different forms of partially patrimonial systems, including various forms of decentralization and partial privatization. This article uses both Weber and contemporary agency theory to evaluate the success of these new forms of partially patrimonial administration and to suggest ways in which they could be made more effective.Publication Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002-10)Most analyses of property rights and economic development point to the negative influence of insecure property rights on private investment. The authors focus instead on the largely unexamined effects of insecure property rights on government policy choices. They identify one significant anomaly-dramatically higher public investment in countries with insecure property rights-and use it to make the following broad claims about insecure property rights; 1) They increase rent-seeking. 2) They may reduce the incentives of governments to use tax revenues for productive purposes, such as public investment. 3) They do so whether one regards the principal problem of insecure property rights as the maintenance of law and order, which government spending can potentially remedy, or as the threat of expropriation by government itself, and therefore not remediable by government spending. The authors present substantial empirical evidence to support these claims.Publication Linking Local Government Discretion and Accountability in Decentralisation(2010)Decentralisation offers significant opportunities to improve government accountability by exerting stronger pressures both from below (demand) and above (supply). The literature contains many examples, however, where the potential has not been realised, partly because decentralisation reforms have often been introduced without thinking through their accountability implications. Even when accountability is taken into account, the efforts tend to emphasise either the supply or the demand side of the equation, but not both. Drawing on the sets of literature on fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation, this article presents a methodology for studying this.
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