Publication:
Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice: Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorSergenti, Ernest
dc.contributor.authorAl-Dahdah, Edouard
dc.contributor.authorCorduneanu-Huci, Cristina
dc.contributor.authorRaballand, Gael
dc.contributor.authorAbabsa, Myriam
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-19T21:41:56Z
dc.date.available2016-07-19T21:41:56Z
dc.date.issued2016-07-19
dc.description.abstractThe primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good” laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way? We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks – policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don't, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil. Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations. Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/978-1-4648-0886-9
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4648-0886-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/24715
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWashington, DC: World Bank
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDirections in Development--Pubic Sector Governance;
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectIMPLEMENTATION
dc.subjectENFORCEMENT
dc.subjectLAWS
dc.subjectCUSTOMS
dc.subjectPOLICY
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectINHERITANCE
dc.subjectRULE OF LAW
dc.subjectINCENTIVES
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectDISCRETION
dc.titleRules on Paper, Rules in Practiceen
dc.title.subtitleEnforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africaen
dc.typeBooken
dc.typeLivrefr
dc.typeLibroes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleRules on Paper, Rules in Practice: Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
okr.date.disclosure2016-07-19
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-15T11:18:52.614610Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Publication
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/978-1-4648-0886-9
okr.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0886-9
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum210886
okr.identifier.report107158
okr.importedtrue
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlsftp://107.21.26.223:22//sftp/production/okr_delivery/1992099/9781464808869.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeMiddle East and North Africa
okr.region.countryJordan
okr.region.countryMorocco
okr.region.countryTunisia
okr.region.geographicalMiddle East
okr.region.geographicalNorth Africa
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicGovernance::Politics and Government
okr.topicGovernance::Regional Governance
okr.topicLaw and Development::Judicial System Reform
okr.topicLaw and Development::Law and Gender
okr.topicLaw and Development::Tax Law
okr.topicLaw and Development::Trade Law
okr.unitGGODR
relation.isAuthorOfPublication3eb70ac7-41f2-524f-8e0b-85efd0d0f093
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc99a9d87-0195-559b-96fd-488b83370cdf
relation.isAuthorOfPublication8762e74d-2213-55a0-aa8d-dfe419512491
relation.isAuthorOfPublication35a7796c-c819-58f0-8a1c-e67da74d2d84
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery8762e74d-2213-55a0-aa8d-dfe419512491
relation.isSeriesOfPublication706db16a-e556-46f0-8283-1b4a4b88645c
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery706db16a-e556-46f0-8283-1b4a4b88645c
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
9781464808869.pdf
Size:
2.72 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
English PDF
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download
Collections
Directions in Development