Publication: The Importance of Political Selection for Bureaucratic Effectiveness (First published: 19 April 2023)
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Date
2023-08-14
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0013-0427 (print)
1468-0335 (online)
1468-0335 (online)
Published
2023-08-14
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Abstract
Bureaucratic effectiveness has come to the fore in research as necessary for economic growth and development. This paper contributes empirical evidence to understand the building blocks of bureaucracy by gathering rich survey data in a typical institutional environment of the developing world. The data reveal a robust correlation between the selection of local politicians and bureaucratic effectiveness. In districts in Uganda where locally elected politicians have higher survey-based measures of integrity (or honesty), the bureaucracy is more effective in delivering public heath services. This evidence supports current research, and encourages future research on how the selection of political agents into government is an important determinant of bureaucratic effectiveness.
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