Publication:
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

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dc.contributor.authorKeefer, Philip
dc.contributor.authorNeumayer, Eric
dc.contributor.authorPlumper, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30T07:28:47Z
dc.date.available2012-03-30T07:28:47Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractGovernments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.en
dc.identifier.citationWorld Development
dc.identifier.issn0305750X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610
dc.language.isoEN
dc.relation.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.subjectHealth Production I120
dc.subjectEconomics of Regulation L510
dc.subjectIndustry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780
dc.subjectClimate
dc.subjectNatural Disasters
dc.subjectGlobal Warming Q540
dc.titleEarthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Preventionen
dc.title.alternativeWorld Developmenten
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.typeArticle de journalfr
dc.typeArtículo de revistaes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.doctypeJournal Article
okr.externalcontentExternal Content
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum1003
okr.journal.nbpages1530-1541
okr.language.supporteden
okr.peerreviewAcademic Peer Review
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.010
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1255965&site=ehost-live
okr.relation.associatedurlhttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/386/description#description
okr.relation.associatedurlhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/19863
okr.volume39
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