Person: Godinho, Catrina
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Last updated: February 21, 2024
Biography
Catrina Godinho is a political economist working on topics related to climate and
development.
She is a fellow of the Energy for Growth Hub and an Agora Energiewende
alumna, and was previously a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute of Energy
Studies. Her research interests include the political economy of structural and policy
reforms; sustainable development; climate policy, action, and tracking; just transitions; and
energy development and governance. She is an author of several articles, working papers,
reports, and book chapters. She holds a master’s degree in social science from the
University of Cape Town, South Africa.
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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
Publication Within Reach: Navigating the Political Economy of Decarbonization(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2023-11-16) Hallegatte, Stéphane; Godinho, Catrina; Rentschler, Jun; Avner, Paolo; Dorband, Ira Irina; Knudsen, Camilla; Lemke, Jana; Mealy, PennyDespite global commitments made through the Paris Agreement in 2015 to combat climate change, their translation into national policies has been slow, raising concerns about the feasibility of achieving climate targets. While policies face many obstacles, the political economy is one of the primary impediments to climate action, and urgency to reduce emissions makes slow and gradual approach increasingly insufficient. The report attempts to identify key political economy barriers and explore options to address them through the 4i Framework, considering how institutions, interests, ideas, and influence affect the political economy. The report offers a practical guide to help countries address political economy barriers when implementing climate policies with three prongs: (1) Climate Governance: governments can adapt their institutional framework, in ways that fit with the pre-existing political economy and moving from opportunistic and unstable to strategic and stable climate institutions. Establishing strategic climate governance institutions – such as climate change framework laws, long-term strategies, or just transition frameworks - can alter the political economy, set clear objectives, improve coordination across actors, and improve the ability to monitor progress and hold decisionmakers accountable. (2) Policy Sequencing: policies can be prioritized and sequenced based on dynamic efficiency, considering not only the economic costs and benefits, but also their feasibility and long-term impact on the political economy. The Climate Policy Feasibility Frontier tool can help identify policies that can overcome short-term political economy obstacles, and at the same time improve capacities and change the political economy to facilitate further climate action. (3) Policy Design and Engagement, considers the effective implementation of climate reforms by tactically navigating political economy constraints. This involves engaging citizens to create process legitimacy and reducing and managing distributional effects, not only across but also within income groups.Publication Learning from Power Sector Reform Experiences: The Case of Kenya(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-04) Eberhard, Anton; Godinho, CatrinaTwo successive waves of reform have fundamentally altered the structure and organization of Kenya's vibrant power sector, which boasts a tradition of strong technical and commercial performance. In the first wave -- beginning in 1996 and largely donor-driven -- policy and regulatory functions were separated from commercial activities; generation was unbundled from transmission and distribution; cost-reflective tariffs were introduced; and generation was liberalized. In the second wave -- beginning in 2002 and led by domestic reform champions -- the thrust of first-wave reforms was continued, with the strengthening of independent regulation, partial privatization of the generation company (KenGen), and establishment of complementary entities. Although the government retains majority ownership of the largest power utilities in the country (Kenya Power, ~51 percent; KenGen, ~70 percent), Kenya has been able to position itself as one of the foremost destinations in the region for private energy investment. The reforms have improved the operational efficiency of the sector, increased cost recovery, and captured a significant amount of private sector investment. At the same time, the state has remained an important investor, playing a pivotal role in expanding generation capacity, scaling up electrification at an exceptionally rapid pace, and leading diversification toward geothermal energy. Political influence in sector decisions remains significant, in planning and tariff reviews.Publication Learning from Power Sector Reform Experiences: The Case of Uganda(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019-04) Eberhard, Anton; Godinho, CatrinaUganda's power sector structure is among the most sophisticated in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Uganda is one of only a handful of countries in the region where tariffs are close to being cost reflective. While reforms were swift and comprehensive, following the 1999 Electricity Act, significant difficulties were encountered along the way that prevented the benefits of reform from materializing until much later. The failed first attempt with the Bujagali Hydropower independent power producer left the country heavily exposed to the 2005/06 and 2010/12 droughts, which in turn created difficulties for the new private distribution utility, Umeme, and led to a relaxation of the regulatory performance targets for the concession. This situation led to a buildup of frustration with the new operator and the launch of two public enquiries, which recommended termination of the concession. In 2012, with the easing of drought conditions and the completion of the Bujagali Hydropower Project following a second independent power producer arrangement, there was improvement in the availability of power. This made it possible to set more demanding performance targets for the concessionaire, Umeme, which fed through into substantial improvements in operational efficiency and accelerating service coverage. Although the reform model was eventually able to deliver results, the associated cost was comparatively high. Furthermore, the extension of the private concession model to financially unviable rural areas did not prove to be successful. Access rates began to pick up only following the adoption of a revised approach in 2012, built around government-led and donor-funded expansion of rural networks.