Publication:
Dividing the Spoils: Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition

dc.contributor.authorKapstein, Ethan B.
dc.contributor.authorMilanovic, Branko
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T18:27:01Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T18:27:01Z
dc.date.issued2000-03
dc.description.abstractThe authors present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better educated and had more favorable expectations for the future. Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The political elite were reelected because industrial interests bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in return for electoral support. Bur special interests, venal bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule, not the exemption, elsewhere as well.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/438329/dividing-spoils-pensions-privatization-reform-russias-transition
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2292
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/22313
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 2292
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectAGENCY PROBLEMS
dc.subjectASSET STRIPPING
dc.subjectAUTHORITY
dc.subjectBANKING SYSTEMS
dc.subjectBOOK VALUE
dc.subjectBUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS
dc.subjectCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
dc.subjectCAPITAL GAIN
dc.subjectCAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subjectCITIZENS
dc.subjectCOMMUNISM
dc.subjectCOMMUNIST
dc.subjectCOMMUNIST PARTY
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectDECENTRALIZATION
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectDISTRICTS
dc.subjectECONOMIC REFORM
dc.subjectECONOMIES IN TRANSITION
dc.subjectELECTED OFFICIALS
dc.subjectELECTORAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectENTERPRISE REFORM
dc.subjectENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING
dc.subjectFISCAL
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICY
dc.subjectFISCAL STANCE
dc.subjectFOREIGN INVESTORS
dc.subjectFOREIGN LOANS
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGINI COEFFICIENT
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
dc.subjectHEADACHES
dc.subjectHUMAN RESOURCES
dc.subjectHUMAN RESOURCES
dc.subjectIMPOTENCE
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINDEXATION
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
dc.subjectINFLATION
dc.subjectINFORMAL SECTOR
dc.subjectINTEREST RATES
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
dc.subjectMANAGERS
dc.subjectMARKET VALUE
dc.subjectPAYMENT ARREARS
dc.subjectPAYROLL TAXES
dc.subjectPENSIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CONTROL
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ELITE
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPRESIDENCY
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION AGENCY
dc.subjectPROFESSIONS
dc.subjectPROFIT SEEKING
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURE
dc.subjectPUBLIC OPINION
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectREGRESSION ANALYSIS
dc.subjectRENT SEEKING
dc.subjectRETIREMENT
dc.subjectSAVINGS
dc.subjectSCHOOLS
dc.subjectSMALL BUSINESS
dc.subjectSOCIAL POLICY
dc.subjectSOCIAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectSOCIAL SAFETY
dc.subjectSOCIAL SAFETY NET
dc.subjectSOCIAL SECURITY
dc.subjectSOCIAL TRANSFERS
dc.subjectSOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subjectSTATE ASSETS
dc.subjectSTATE ENTERPRISES
dc.subjectSTATE PROPERTY
dc.subjectSTATE REVENUES
dc.subjectSTATE SECTOR
dc.subjectSTATE SUBSIDIES
dc.subjectSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
dc.subjectTAX COLLECTION
dc.subjectTAX EXEMPTIONS
dc.subjectTAX PAYMENTS
dc.subjectTAX RATES
dc.subjectTAX REVENUES
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTOTAL EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectTRANSITION ECONOMIES
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectVOUCHER PRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.subjectWORKERS
dc.subjectWORLD POLITICS
dc.titleDividing the Spoilsen
dc.title.subtitlePensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transitionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleDividing the Spoils: Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition
okr.date.disclosure2010-07-01
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:53:18.545240Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/438329/dividing-spoils-pensions-privatization-reform-russias-transition
okr.globalpracticeSocial Protection and Labor
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid242221468780001198
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2292
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000094946_00022905315633
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum438329
okr.identifier.reportWPS2292
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurl/IB/2000/03/21/000094946_00022905315633/additional/101501322_20041117153502.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeEurope and Central Asia
okr.region.countryPoland
okr.region.countryRussian Federation
okr.region.geographicalCommonwealth of Independent States
okr.region.geographicalEastern Europe
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Theory & Research
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicGovernance::Politics and Government
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Political Economy
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Safety Nets and Transfers
okr.unitPoverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationef885098-1480-5065-99a0-202312d457c2
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryef885098-1480-5065-99a0-202312d457c2
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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