Publication:
Institutional Trap

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dc.contributor.authorDo, Quy-Toan
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-02T13:04:17Z
dc.date.available2013-08-02T13:04:17Z
dc.date.issued2004-04
dc.description.abstractThe author studies the persistence of inequality and inefficient governance in a physical capital accumulation model with perfect information, missing credit markets, and endogenous barriers to entry. When access to investment opportunities is regulated, rent-seeking entrepreneurs form coalitions of potentially varying size to bribe a regulator to restrict entry. Small coalitions run short of resources, while large coalitions suffer more severe free-rider problems. The distribution of wealth thus determines the equilibrium coalition structure of the economy and consequently the level of regulatory capture. A dynamic analysis supports the persistence of inefficiencies in the long run. Initial conditions determine whether the economy converges to a steady state characterized by efficient governance and low levels of inequality, or a path toward an institutional trap where regulatory capture and wealth inequality reinforce each other.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/3391904/institutional-trap
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3291
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14771
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3291
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectENDOGENOUS
dc.subjectCOALITIONS
dc.subjectPERSISTENCE
dc.titleInstitutional Trapen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaGender
okr.crossref.titleInstitutional Trap
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:50:28.468437Z
okr.date.doiregistration2025-08-19T02:17:21.732519Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/3391904/institutional-trap
okr.globalpracticeTransport and ICT
okr.globalpracticeHealth, Nutrition, and Population
okr.guid795701468763797130
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3291
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000012009_20040510171449
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum3391904
okr.identifier.reportWPS3291
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/10/000012009_20040510171449/Rendered/PDF/WPS3291.pdfen
okr.topicHealth Monitoring and Evaluation
okr.topicRoads and Highways
okr.topicInformation and Communication Technologies::Information Technology
okr.topicEarly Child and Children's Health
okr.topicGender::Gender and Health
okr.unitOff of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication51b25ec8-a597-4853-bda2-9423d147f932
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery51b25ec8-a597-4853-bda2-9423d147f932
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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