Publication:
Sweetening the Carrot : Motivating Public Physicians for Better Performance

dc.contributor.authorGarcia-Prado, Ariadna
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-20T19:19:21Z
dc.date.available2012-06-20T19:19:21Z
dc.date.issued2005-11
dc.description.abstractIt is widely observed that many physicians working in public health facilities do not put in the required effort and time in their jobs. At the same time, many public physicians remain highly motivated, working long hours for little financial reward, in providing quality health services. This mix of provider-types poses fundamental challenges in the design of compensation mechanisms and monitoring regime in public facilities, where the objective of any reward-control paradigm is to improve the inoptimal performance of some physicians without compromising the effort of those already motivated. This paper presents a model to explain shirking behavior among public physicians and explores combinations of monitoring and incentive mechanisms that meet the twin objectives of inspiring the shirkers without losing the motivated. Drawing on the basic Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model and the theory of social custom, the paper develops and presents a design of incentive structures that consists of punitive monitoring systems accompanied by non-pecuniary rewards. The analysis shows that intensive monitoring persuades the shirking physicians to improve their performance but may have a negative effect on the morale of those already motivated. The findings indicate that non-pecuniary rewards and recognition for the latter can potentially restore the incentives and counter the deleterious effect of increased supervision. The policy implications are discussed by presenting case studies in the health care context of developing countries.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/11/6415974/sweetening-carrot-motivating-public-physicians-better-performance
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3772
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8563
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3772
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectABSENTEEISM
dc.subjectATTENTION
dc.subjectCOMPETENCE
dc.subjectCOMPETENCIES
dc.subjectCROWDING
dc.subjectDELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES
dc.subjectECONOMIC ANALYSIS
dc.subjectECONOMIC REVIEW
dc.subjectEFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
dc.subjectETHICS
dc.subjectEXPENDITURES
dc.subjectFEE SCHEDULE
dc.subjectHEALTH CARE
dc.subjectHEALTH ECONOMICS
dc.subjectHEALTH PROMOTION
dc.subjectHEALTH SECTOR
dc.subjectHEALTH SECTOR REFORM
dc.subjectHEALTH SERVICE
dc.subjectHEALTH SERVICES
dc.subjectHIGH WAGES
dc.subjectHOSPITAL REVENUES
dc.subjectHOSPITALS
dc.subjectHOURS OF WORK
dc.subjectIMPERFECT INFORMATION
dc.subjectIMPLICIT CONTRACTS
dc.subjectINCENTIVE STRUCTURES
dc.subjectINCENTIVES FOR AGENTS
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectINDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY
dc.subjectINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
dc.subjectINFORMAL PAYMENTS
dc.subjectINTERVENTION
dc.subjectINTUITION
dc.subjectINVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectJOBS
dc.subjectLABOR CONTRACTS
dc.subjectLABOR ECONOMICS
dc.subjectLABOR MARKET
dc.subjectLABOR PRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectLABOR RELATIONS
dc.subjectMARGINAL COST
dc.subjectMARGINAL COSTS
dc.subjectMEDICAL CARE
dc.subjectMOTIVATION
dc.subjectNURSES
dc.subjectPATIENT
dc.subjectPATIENTS
dc.subjectPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH SERVICES
dc.subjectPERCEPTION
dc.subjectPERSONALITY
dc.subjectPERSONNEL
dc.subjectPHYSICIANS
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPRESTIGE
dc.subjectPRIMARY CARE
dc.subjectPRIMARY HEALTH CARE
dc.subjectPSYCHOLOGISTS
dc.subjectPSYCHOLOGY
dc.subjectPUBLIC HEALTH
dc.subjectPUBLIC HEALTH CARE
dc.subjectPUBLIC HOSPITALS
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICE
dc.subjectREAL WAGE
dc.subjectRECOGNITION
dc.subjectRETENTION
dc.subjectSOCIALIZATION
dc.subjectSOCIOLOGISTS
dc.subjectUNEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectUNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
dc.subjectWAGE EFFECT
dc.subjectWORK ENVIRONMENT
dc.subjectWORK ETHIC
dc.subjectWORK IN PROGRESS
dc.subjectWORK PLACE
dc.subjectWORKER
dc.subjectWORKERS
dc.subjectWORKING
dc.subjectWORKING CONDITIONS
dc.subjectWORKPLACE
dc.titleSweetening the Carrot : Motivating Public Physicians for Better Performanceen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaJobs
okr.crossref.titleSweetening The Carrot : Motivating Public Physicians For Better Performance
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:48:30.295858Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/11/6415974/sweetening-carrot-motivating-public-physicians-better-performance
okr.globalpracticeEducation
okr.globalpracticeSocial Protection and Labor
okr.globalpracticeHealth, Nutrition, and Population
okr.guid267031468175148351
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3772
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000016406_20051115163726
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum6415974
okr.identifier.reportWPS3772
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/11/15/000016406_20051115163726/Rendered/PDF/wps3772.pdfen
okr.topicHealth Monitoring and Evaluation
okr.topicEducation::Educational Sciences
okr.topicHealth Economics and Finance
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Labor Markets
okr.topicWork and Working Conditions
okr.topicHealth, Nutrition and Population
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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