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Family Firms and Contractual Institutions

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dc.contributor.authorTsivanidis, Nick
dc.contributor.authorIacovone, Leonardo
dc.contributor.authorMaloney, William F.
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-11T20:18:23Z
dc.date.available2019-04-11T20:18:23Z
dc.date.issued2019-04
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers new evidence on the relationship between contractual institutions, family management, and aggregate performance. The study creates a new firm-level database on management and ownership structures spanning 134 regions in 11 European countries. To guide the empirical analysis, it develops a model of industry equilibrium in which heterogeneous firms decide between family and professional management when the latter are subject to contracting frictions. The paper tests the model's predictions using regional variation in trust within countries. Consistent with the model, the finding show that there is sorting of firms across management modes, in which smaller firms and those in regions with worse contracting environments are more likely to be family managed. These firms are on average 25 percent less productive than professionally managed firms, and moving from the country with the least reliable contracting environment to the most increases total factor productivity by 21.6 percent. Family management rather than ownership drives these results.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/139191554304091289/Family-Firms-and-Contractual-Institutions
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8803
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/31532
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 8803
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectFIRM PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectFAMILY OWNERSHIP
dc.titleFamily Firms and Contractual Institutionsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleFamily Firms and Contractual Institutions
okr.date.disclosure2019-04-03
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/139191554304091289/Family-Firms-and-Contractual-Institutions
okr.guid139191554304091289
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-8803
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b086b392d9_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum30955614
okr.identifier.reportWPS8803
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/139191554304091289/pdf/Family-Firms-and-Contractual-Institutions.pdfen
okr.statistics.combined1505
okr.statistics.dr139191554304091289
okr.statistics.drstats1086
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Organizational Management
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Private Sector Economics
okr.unitEquitable Growth, Finance and Institutions Vice Presidency
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