Publication: Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences
dc.contributor.author | Kee, Hiau Looi | |
dc.contributor.author | Olarreaga, Marcelo | |
dc.contributor.author | Silva, Peri | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-26T16:58:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-26T16:58:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3198 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.3198 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS | |
dc.subject | AGRICULTURE | |
dc.subject | ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL AMERICA | |
dc.subject | CONSUMER SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMERS | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
dc.subject | DICTATORSHIP | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC MARKET | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC PRODUCERS | |
dc.subject | DUMPING | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC FACTORS | |
dc.subject | ELASTICITY | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL STUDIES | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | |
dc.subject | EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | EXPORT GROWTH | |
dc.subject | EXPORTERS | |
dc.subject | EXPORTING COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | EXPORTING COUNTRY | |
dc.subject | EXPORTS | |
dc.subject | FISHING | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN EXPORTERS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN PRODUCERS | |
dc.subject | FREE TRADE | |
dc.subject | FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | FREE TRADE AREA | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT AGENCIES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | IMPORTING COUNTRY | |
dc.subject | IMPORTS | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL TRADE | |
dc.subject | LATIN AMERICAN | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATION | |
dc.subject | LOBBYING | |
dc.subject | LOBBYISTS | |
dc.subject | MARKET ACCESS | |
dc.subject | MINIMIS LEVEL | |
dc.subject | NATIONALS | |
dc.subject | NON-TARIFF BARRIERS | |
dc.subject | POLICY INSTRUMENTS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PREFERENTIAL ACCESS | |
dc.subject | PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | PREFERENTIAL TARIFF | |
dc.subject | PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME | |
dc.subject | PRODUCER SURPLUS | |
dc.subject | PRODUCERS | |
dc.subject | QUOTAS | |
dc.subject | SOUTH AMERICA | |
dc.subject | SOUTH AMERICAN | |
dc.subject | SUBSTITUTION EFFECT | |
dc.subject | TARIFF BARRIERS | |
dc.subject | TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS | |
dc.subject | TARIFF PREFERENCE | |
dc.subject | TARIFF PREFERENCES | |
dc.subject | TARIFF RATES | |
dc.subject | TARIFF REDUCTIONS | |
dc.subject | TARIFF REVENUE | |
dc.subject | TRADE BARRIERS | |
dc.subject | TRADE ISSUES | |
dc.subject | TRADE POLICIES | |
dc.subject | TRADE POLICY | |
dc.subject | TRADE PREFERENCES | |
dc.subject | TRADING PARTNERS | |
dc.subject | UTILITY FUNCTION | |
dc.subject | WELFARE FUNCTION | |
dc.subject | WORLD TRADE | |
dc.title | Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Market Access for Sale: Latin America’s Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:45:39.276854Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences | |
okr.globalpractice | Poverty | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 882901468780340501 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3198 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000090341_20041108143756 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 5296837 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3198 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/08/000090341_20041108143756/Rendered/PDF/wps3198.pdf | en |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Poverty and Trade | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Free Trade | |
okr.topic | Governance::National Governance | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Export Competitiveness | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Rules of Origin | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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