Publication:
Corruption in Customs

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dc.contributor.authorChalendard, Cyril
dc.contributor.authorFernandes, Ana M.
dc.contributor.authorRaballand, Gael
dc.contributor.authorRijkers, Bob
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-14T14:01:58Z
dc.date.available2021-10-14T14:01:58Z
dc.date.issued2021-10
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/726921634045778647/Corruption-in-Customs
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-9802
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/36388
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 9802
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectCUSTOMS
dc.subjectTARIFF EVASION
dc.subjectTAX ENFORCEMENT
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.titleCorruption in Customsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleCorruption in Customs
okr.date.disclosure2021-10-12
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:07:15.529515Z
okr.date.lastmodified2021-10-12T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/726921634045778647/Corruption-in-Customs
okr.guid726921634045778647
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-9802
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b088a6abc0_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum33482635
okr.identifier.reportWPS9802
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/726921634045778647/pdf/Corruption-in-Customs.pdfen
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::Customs and Trade
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::Trade Policy
okr.topicLaw and Development::Trade Law
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Public Sector Corruption/Anticorruption Measures
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group, Development Economics; and the Governance Global Practice
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