Publication: Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis
dc.contributor.author | Keefer, Philip | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-26T16:45:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-26T16:45:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-10 | |
dc.description.abstract | The author proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests, at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention, and resolution of financial crisis. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5304231/elections-special-interests-fiscal-costs-financial-crisis | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3439 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14204 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.3439 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTABILITY | |
dc.subject | AGRICULTURE | |
dc.subject | AMBITION | |
dc.subject | BAILOUT COSTS | |
dc.subject | BANK ASSETS | |
dc.subject | BANK DEPOSITS | |
dc.subject | BANK FAILURES | |
dc.subject | BANK INSOLVENCY | |
dc.subject | BANK LIABILITIES | |
dc.subject | BANK RUN | |
dc.subject | BANK SIZE | |
dc.subject | BANKING CRISES | |
dc.subject | BANKING DEPOSITS | |
dc.subject | BANKING OPERATIONS | |
dc.subject | BANKING SECTOR | |
dc.subject | BANKING SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | BANKS | |
dc.subject | CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL FLOWS | |
dc.subject | CHECKS | |
dc.subject | CITIZENS | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVENESS | |
dc.subject | CONSTITUENCIES | |
dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | CURRENCY | |
dc.subject | CURRENT ACCOUNT | |
dc.subject | DEBT | |
dc.subject | DECISION MAKING | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACIES | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | DEPOSIT INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | DEVALUATION | |
dc.subject | DISCOUNT RATES | |
dc.subject | DISTRICTS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC SECTORS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC SHOCKS | |
dc.subject | ELECTIONS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
dc.subject | EXOGENOUS SHOCKS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL CRISIS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SECTOR | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | FISCAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN EXCHANGE | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SPENDING | |
dc.subject | ILLIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | INDEBTEDNESS | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | JURISDICTIONS | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATION | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATORS | |
dc.subject | LEGISLATURE | |
dc.subject | LENDING PRACTICES | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | LOBBYING | |
dc.subject | LOBBYISTS | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL INCOME | |
dc.subject | OFFSETTING | |
dc.subject | PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | POLICY IMPLEMENTATION | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | POLITICIANS | |
dc.subject | PRESIDENTS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SPENDING | |
dc.subject | REAL INTEREST RATE | |
dc.subject | RECAPITALIZATION | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY POLICY | |
dc.subject | REPRESENTATIVES | |
dc.subject | SAVINGS | |
dc.subject | SEPARATION OF POWERS | |
dc.subject | SMALL BANKS | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL GROUPS | |
dc.subject | TERMS OF TRADE | |
dc.subject | VETO | |
dc.subject | VETO POWER | |
dc.subject | VOTERS | |
dc.title | Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:23:49.097747Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5304231/elections-special-interests-fiscal-costs-financial-crisis | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.guid | 619871468761707609 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3439 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000012009_20041109150225 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 5304231 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3439 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/09/000012009_20041109150225/Rendered/PDF/WPS3439.pdf | en |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Financial Intermediation | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Development::Decentralization | |
okr.topic | Payment Systems and Infrastructure | |
okr.topic | Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring | |
okr.topic | Governance::National Governance | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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