Publication:
Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions

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dc.contributor.authorDhillon, Amrita
dc.contributor.authorRigolini, Jamele
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-26T19:19:07Z
dc.date.available2012-06-26T19:19:07Z
dc.date.issued2006-12
dc.description.abstractThe authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in "connectedness," with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by producers by means of bribes. When legal enforcement is poor, consumers connect more with one another to improve informal enforcement. In contrast, a well-connected network of consumers reduces producers' incentives to bribe. In equilibrium, the model predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of productivity shocks, bribing, and the use of informal enforcement, providing a physical explanation of why developing countries often fail to have efficient legal systems. Firm-level estimations confirm the partial equilibrium implications of the model.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7259034/development-interaction-enforcement-institutions
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4090
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/9280
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 4090
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectADVERSE SELECTION
dc.subjectAGENTS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectAPPLICATIONS
dc.subjectASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectBUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATE
dc.subjectECONOMETRICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM PRICES
dc.subjectEXPECTED UTILITY
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectFIXED COSTS
dc.subjectFREE ENTRY
dc.subjectFUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subjectIMPERFECT INFORMATION
dc.subjectMARGINAL COST
dc.subjectMARGINAL COSTS
dc.subjectMARKET FORCES
dc.subjectMARKET SHARE
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectNASH EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPREMIUMS
dc.subjectPRICE COMPETITION
dc.subjectPRISONERS DILEMMA
dc.subjectPRODUCT MARKETS
dc.subjectPRODUCT QUALITY
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subjectSAVINGS
dc.subjectSPREAD
dc.subjectSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
dc.subjectSUBSTITUTE
dc.subjectSUNK COSTS
dc.titleDevelopment and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutionsen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaPublic-Private Partnerships
okr.crossref.titleDevelopment And The Interaction Of Enforcement Institutions
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:01:55.550829Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/12/7259034/development-interaction-enforcement-institutions
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeTrade and Competitiveness
okr.guid201821468182661752
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4090
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000016406_20061211154057
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum7259034
okr.identifier.reportWPS4090
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/12/11/000016406_20061211154057/Rendered/PDF/wps4090.pdfen
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Business Environment
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicInsurance and Risk Mitigation
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Markets and Market Access
okr.topicPrivate Sector Development::Business in Development
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb51f7805-9174-58dc-a585-0ca1b7edbebc
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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