Publication:
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions

dc.contributor.author de Walque, Damien
dc.contributor.author Valente, Christine
dc.date.accessioned 2018-06-19T16:11:51Z
dc.date.available 2018-06-19T16:11:51Z
dc.date.issued 2018-06
dc.description.abstract Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an education conditional cash transfer program, when given to parents independently of any transfer, can have a substantial effect on school attendance. The effect is as large as 75 percent of the effect of a conditional cash transfer incentivizing parents, and not significantly different from it. In contrast, a conditional transfer program incentivizing children instead of parents is nearly twice as effective as an "information only" treatment providing the same information to parents about their child's attendance. Taken together, these results suggest that children have substantial agency in their schooling decisions. The paper replicates the findings from most evaluations of conditional cash transfers that gains in attendance achieved by incentivizing parents financially do not translate into gains in test scores. But it finds that both the information only treatment and the alternative intervention incentivizing children substantially improve math test scores. en
dc.identifier http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905
dc.language English
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8476
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder World Bank
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subject CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
dc.subject ABSENTEEISM
dc.subject SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
dc.subject MORAL HAZARD
dc.subject DROPOUT RATE
dc.subject PRIMARY EDUCATION
dc.subject CASH INCENTIVES
dc.subject EDUCATION POLICY
dc.subject TEST SCORE
dc.title Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.type Document de travail fr
dc.type Documento de trabajo es
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.crossref.title Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions
okr.date.disclosure 2018-06-14
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions
okr.identifier.doi 10.1596/1813-9450-8476
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 090224b085bff8e5_2_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 29999364
okr.identifier.report WPS8476
okr.imported true en
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/pdf/WPS8476.pdf en
okr.statistics.combined 5447
okr.statistics.dr 720071529003623702
okr.statistics.drstats 5083
okr.topic Education :: Economics of Education
okr.topic Education :: Education For All
okr.topic Education :: Educational Sciences
okr.topic Education :: Primary Education
okr.topic Education :: Public Examination System
okr.topic Poverty Reduction :: Conditional Cash Transfers
okr.unit Development Research Group, Development Economics
relation.isAuthorOfPublication b5740416-f4ef-5235-974a-47bd257d61a4
relation.isSeriesOfPublication 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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