Publication:
Populist Fiscal Policy

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dc.contributor.authorKhemani, Stuti
dc.contributor.authorWane, Waly
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-01T18:13:23Z
dc.date.available2012-06-01T18:13:23Z
dc.date.issued2008-10
dc.description.abstractPolitical economy explanations for fiscal profligacy are dominated by models of bargaining among organized interest groups over group-specific targeted benefits financed by generalized taxation. These models predict that governments consisting of a coalition of political parties spend more than single-party regimes. This paper presents an alternative model-that of populist pressure on political parties to spend more on the general public good, financed by costly income taxation-and obtains the opposite prediction. According to this model, public spending and taxes are lower under coalition governments that can win elections more cheaply. Indeed, in order to win elections, coalition partners need to satisfy a smaller share of swing voters than does a single-party government that enjoys narrower support from its core constituency. A coalition government therefore spends less on the public good to capture the share of the swing vote necessary for re-election. Using data from more than 70 countries during the period 1970-2006, the paper provides robust supporting evidence for this alternative model.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9972031/populist-fiscal-policy
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4762
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/6893
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 4762
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACCOUNTING
dc.subjectBUDGET CONSTRAINT
dc.subjectBUDGET CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectBUDGET DEFICITS
dc.subjectBUDGET PROCESS
dc.subjectBUYING VOTES
dc.subjectCABINET
dc.subjectCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
dc.subjectCENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subjectCOALITION GOVERNMENT
dc.subjectCOALITION GOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCONFLICT OF INTEREST
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCIES
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCY
dc.subjectCONSTITUENT
dc.subjectCONSTITUENTS
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEFICIT FINANCING
dc.subjectDEFICITS
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT BANK
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDISPOSABLE INCOME
dc.subjectDYNAMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICIES
dc.subjectECONOMIC RESOURCES
dc.subjectECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS
dc.subjectECONOMICS RESEARCH
dc.subjectELECTION
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectELECTORAL POLITICS
dc.subjectELECTORAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectEVASION
dc.subjectEXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT
dc.subjectEXPENDITURE
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectFISCAL DEFICIT
dc.subjectFISCAL DEFICITS
dc.subjectFISCAL PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICIES
dc.subjectFISCAL POLICY
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGDP PER CAPITA
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT BORROWING
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT BUDGET
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT DEBT
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT FINANCE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT POLICY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subjectGROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
dc.subjectGROWTH RATE
dc.subjectHOLDING
dc.subjectHUMAN DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME TAX
dc.subjectINCOME TAXES
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINSTRUMENT
dc.subjectINTEREST PAYMENTS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL FINANCE
dc.subjectLAFFER CURVE
dc.subjectLEGISLATORS
dc.subjectLEVY
dc.subjectLOCAL CURRENCY
dc.subjectMACROECONOMICS
dc.subjectMARGINAL UTILITY
dc.subjectOPTIMIZATION
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPARLIAMENTS
dc.subjectPARTY COMPETITION
dc.subjectPOLICY IMPLICATIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL EXECUTIVE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL EXECUTIVES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL GROUPS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectPRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
dc.subjectPROGRESSIVE TAXES
dc.subjectPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
dc.subjectPUBLIC
dc.subjectPUBLIC ECONOMICS
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC RESOURCES
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING PROGRAMS
dc.subjectREAL GDP
dc.subjectREGIONAL DUMMIES
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAX RATE
dc.subjectTAX RATES
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTAX REVENUES
dc.subjectTAX SYSTEM
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTRANSACTION
dc.subjectTRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subjectTREASURY
dc.subjectTURNOVER
dc.subjectUTILITIES
dc.subjectVOTER TURNOUT
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectWELFARE ECONOMICS
dc.titlePopulist Fiscal Policyen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titlePopulist Fiscal Policy
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T12:23:48.165611Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9972031/populist-fiscal-policy
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid633551468136199999
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-4762
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000158349_20081027145330
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum9972031
okr.identifier.reportWPS4762
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/10/27/000158349_20081027145330/Rendered/PDF/WPS4762.pdfen
okr.sectorEducation :: Primary education
okr.themePublic expenditure, financial management and procurement
okr.themeLegal institutions for a market economy
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicGovernance::Parliamentary Government
okr.topicGovernance::E-Government
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development::Debt Markets
okr.topicPublic Sector Economics and Finance
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth
okr.topicPublic Sector Development
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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