Publication: Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control
dc.contributor.author | Morck, Randall | |
dc.contributor.author | Yeung, Bernard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-27T17:04:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-27T17:04:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-09 | |
dc.description.abstract | Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implications on corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a sufficiently large part of the country's corporate sector. The authors consider the reasons why family control and control pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some industrial economies. They also discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding firms predominate in the United States. The authors discuss policies that countries might adopt to discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5168113/special-issues-relating-corporate-governance-family-control | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3406 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14238 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.3406 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTING | |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | ASSETS | |
dc.subject | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION | |
dc.subject | BANKING SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL GAINS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | COMPANY | |
dc.subject | COMPETITORS | |
dc.subject | CONGLOMERATES | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE ASSETS | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE CONTROL | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | CORPORATIONS | |
dc.subject | DECISION MAKING | |
dc.subject | DISCLOSURE | |
dc.subject | DIVIDENDS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC HISTORY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC POWER | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURSHIP | |
dc.subject | EQUITY MARKETS | |
dc.subject | EQUITY STAKE | |
dc.subject | EXPANSION | |
dc.subject | EXPENDITURES | |
dc.subject | EXPROPRIATION | |
dc.subject | FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FIXED ASSETS | |
dc.subject | FREE TRADE | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT | |
dc.subject | GUARANTORS | |
dc.subject | HOLDING COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | INHERITANCE | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | INVESTOR PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | LARGE SHAREHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | LISTED COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | LONG TERM INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | MERGERS | |
dc.subject | OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PRICE DECLINES | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT MARKETS | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | RATE OF RETURN | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDER VALUE | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | SHAREHOLDINGS | |
dc.subject | SHOPS | |
dc.subject | SMALL BUSINESSES | |
dc.subject | SMALL FIRMS | |
dc.subject | STOCK MARKETS | |
dc.subject | STOCK PRICES | |
dc.subject | STORES | |
dc.subject | TAX SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | TAXATION | |
dc.subject | VALUE ADDED | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.title | Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crossref.title | Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:13:37.177Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5168113/special-issues-relating-corporate-governance-family-control | |
okr.globalpractice | Transport and ICT | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 294611468761962776 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-3406 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000012009_20041008124933 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 5168113 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS3406 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/10/08/000012009_20041008124933/Rendered/PDF/WPS3406.pdf | en |
okr.topic | Private Sector Development::Small and Medium Size Enterprises | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Microfinance | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | International Terrorism and Counterterrorism | |
okr.topic | Small Scale Enterprise | |
okr.topic | Infrastructure Economics and Finance::Private Participation in Infrastructure | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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