Publication: Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms
dc.contributor.author | Du Caju, Philip | |
dc.contributor.author | Kosma, Theodora | |
dc.contributor.author | Lawless, Martina | |
dc.contributor.author | Messina, Julian | |
dc.contributor.author | Room, Tairi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-15T14:40:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-15T14:40:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-07 | |
dc.description.abstract | Firms very rarely cut nominal wages, even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages. The paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts. Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in Western European (EU-15) countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19878434/firms-avoid-cutting-wages-survey-evidence-european-firms | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-6976 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19349 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank Group, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6976 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ADVERSE SELECTION | |
dc.subject | AVERAGE WAGE | |
dc.subject | BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | BARGAINING POWER | |
dc.subject | BARGAINING SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS CYCLE | |
dc.subject | CLERKS | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE BARGAINING | |
dc.subject | COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS | |
dc.subject | COMPANY | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE MARKETS | |
dc.subject | DISMISSAL | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC SHOCKS | |
dc.subject | EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS | |
dc.subject | EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES | |
dc.subject | EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY | |
dc.subject | EFFICIENCY WAGES | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYEE | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYEE TURNOVER | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYERS | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT TURNOVER | |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | EXISTING WORKFORCE | |
dc.subject | EXPANSIONS | |
dc.subject | EXPLICIT CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | FIRING | |
dc.subject | FIRM LEVEL | |
dc.subject | FIRM SIZE | |
dc.subject | FIRM SURVEY | |
dc.subject | FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | HIGH WAGES | |
dc.subject | HIRING | |
dc.subject | HUMAN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | HUMAN RESOURCES | |
dc.subject | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | JOB EXPERIENCE | |
dc.subject | JOBS | |
dc.subject | LABOR CONTRACTS | |
dc.subject | LABOR ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | LABOR FORCE | |
dc.subject | LABOR MARKET | |
dc.subject | LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY | |
dc.subject | LABOR MARKET REFORM | |
dc.subject | LABOR MARKET REFORMS | |
dc.subject | LABOR MARKETS | |
dc.subject | LABOR PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | LABOR REGULATION | |
dc.subject | LABOR RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | LABOR TURNOVER | |
dc.subject | LABOUR | |
dc.subject | LABOUR COST | |
dc.subject | LABOUR COSTS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR FORCE | |
dc.subject | LABOUR MARKET | |
dc.subject | LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPANTS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR MARKET REFORM | |
dc.subject | LABOUR MARKETS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR REGULATION | |
dc.subject | LABOUR REGULATIONS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR RELATIONS | |
dc.subject | LABOUR TURNOVER | |
dc.subject | LABOUR UNIONS | |
dc.subject | LAYOFFS | |
dc.subject | LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | MONITORING COSTS | |
dc.subject | MOTIVATION | |
dc.subject | NOMINAL WAGES | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | PREVIOUS STUDIES | |
dc.subject | PROBIT REGRESSIONS | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT MARKET | |
dc.subject | PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION | |
dc.subject | PRODUCTION PROCESS | |
dc.subject | REAL WAGE | |
dc.subject | REAL WAGES | |
dc.subject | RECRUITMENT | |
dc.subject | REMUNERATION | |
dc.subject | RETAIL TRADE | |
dc.subject | RISING UNEMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | SKILLED EMPLOYEES | |
dc.subject | SKILLED WORKERS | |
dc.subject | STAFF | |
dc.subject | TEMPORARY WORKERS | |
dc.subject | TOTAL EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | TRADE UNIONS | |
dc.subject | TRAINING COST | |
dc.subject | TRAINING COSTS | |
dc.subject | UNDEREMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | UNEMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | UNION DENSITIES | |
dc.subject | UNIONIZATION | |
dc.subject | WAGE BARGAINING | |
dc.subject | WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | WAGE BILL | |
dc.subject | WAGE DETERMINATION | |
dc.subject | WAGE DISPERSION | |
dc.subject | WAGE FLEXIBILITY | |
dc.subject | WAGE INCREASE | |
dc.subject | WAGE LEVEL | |
dc.subject | WAGE RIGIDITIES | |
dc.subject | WAGE RIGIDITY | |
dc.subject | WHITE COLLAR WORKERS | |
dc.subject | WORKER | |
dc.subject | WORKER MORALE | |
dc.subject | WORKER PRODUCTIVITY | |
dc.subject | WORKERS | |
dc.subject | WORKING CONDITIONS | |
dc.title | Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages : Survey Evidence from European Firms | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crossref.title | Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages: Survey Evidence from European Firms | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2014-07-01 | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T11:05:03.920447Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19878434/firms-avoid-cutting-wages-survey-evidence-european-firms | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.guid | 453751468037522557 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-6976 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20140722152149 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 19878434 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS6976 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/22/000158349_20140722152149/Rendered/PDF/WPS6976.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Europe and Central Asia | |
okr.region.geographical | Europe | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Microfinance | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Income | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Policies | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Markets | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor::Labor Management and Relations | |
okr.unit | Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 6610b5d1-45b5-5f8a-864f-5d79bae5927c | |
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 6610b5d1-45b5-5f8a-864f-5d79bae5927c | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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