Publication:
Price Caps, Efficiency Payoffs, and Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation in Latin America

dc.contributor.authorEstache, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorGuasch, Jose-Luis
dc.contributor.authorTrujillo, Lourdes
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-01T18:45:18Z
dc.date.available2014-05-01T18:45:18Z
dc.date.issued2003-08
dc.description.abstractTwenty years ago, as the United Kingdom was getting ready to launch the privatization of its public services, Professor Littlechild developed and operationalized the concept of price caps as a regulatory regime to control for residual monopoly conditions in those services. Ten years later, Latin American countries, as they embarked into their own infrastructure reforms, also adopted the price cap regulatory model. Relying on a large data base on the factors driving contract renegotiation in the region and a survey of the literature on efficiency gains, the authors assess the impact of this regulatory regime in Latin America. They show that while the expected efficiency gains were amply achieved, these gains were seldom passed on to the users. Instead they were shared by the government and the firms. Moreover, the adoption of price caps implied higher costs of capital and hence, tariffs, and brought down levels of investment.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2507713/price-caps-efficiency-payoffs-infrastructure-contract-renegotiation-latin-america
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3129
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/18130
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 3129
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACCOUNTING
dc.subjectACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
dc.subjectALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectAUCTION
dc.subjectAUCTIONS
dc.subjectAUTONOMY
dc.subjectAVERAGE COSTS
dc.subjectCAPACITY BUILDING
dc.subjectCAPITAL EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectCAPITALIZATION
dc.subjectCOMPOUNDING
dc.subjectCONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectCOST OF CAPITAL
dc.subjectCOST OF EQUITY
dc.subjectCOSTS OF CAPITAL
dc.subjectCROSS-SUBSIDIES
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEQUITY INVESTMENTS
dc.subjectGENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME DISTRIBUTION
dc.subjectINCOME LEVELS
dc.subjectINDEXATION
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION
dc.subjectMONOPOLIES
dc.subjectPRICE CAP
dc.subjectPRICE CAPS
dc.subjectPRIVATE FIRMS
dc.subjectPRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
dc.subjectPRIVATE INVESTMENT
dc.subjectPRIVATE OPERATORS
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPUBLIC ENTERPRISES
dc.subjectPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectQUALITY OF SERVICE
dc.subjectREGULATORY FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectREGULATORY REGIME
dc.subjectRETIREMENT
dc.subjectRISK FACTORS
dc.subjectSANITATION SECTOR
dc.subjectSERVICE QUALITY
dc.subjectTARIFF ADJUSTMENTS
dc.subjectTARIFF STRUCTURE
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTRANSPORT
dc.subjectUTILITIES
dc.subjectWATER COMPANIES
dc.subjectWATER SECTOR
dc.subjectWATER SERVICES PRICE CAP REGULATION
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectREGULATORY FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectOPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectMONOPOLIES
dc.subjectINFRASTRUCTURE REFORM
dc.subjectCONTRACT NEGOTIATION
dc.subjectCAPITAL COSTS
dc.subjectTARIFF ESCALATION
dc.subjectINVESTMENT REGULATION
dc.subjectWATER SERVICES
dc.subjectPRICE CAP REGULATION
dc.titlePrice Caps, Efficiency Payoffs, and Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation in Latin Americaen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaJobs
okr.crossref.titlePrice Caps, Efficiency Payoffs and Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation in Latin America
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:35:39.180564Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2507713/price-caps-efficiency-payoffs-infrastructure-contract-renegotiation-latin-america
okr.globalpracticeSocial Protection and Labor
okr.globalpracticeFinance and Markets
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeWater
okr.guid311391468753319183
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3129
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000094946_03091104060249
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum2507713
okr.identifier.reportWPS3129
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091104060249/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeLatin America & Caribbean
okr.region.geographicalLatin America
okr.sectorPublic Administration, Law, and Justice :: General public administration sector
okr.topicBanks and Banking Reform
okr.topicEnvironmental Economics and Policies
okr.topicInternational Terrorism and Counterterrorism
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Decentralization
okr.topicWater Supply and Sanitation::Water Supply and Sanitation Participation
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Labor Policies
okr.topicWater Supply and Sanitation::Community Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation
okr.topicFinance and Financial Sector Development
okr.unitInfrastructure Vice Presidency
okr.volume1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4cc9b022-436f-51a0-b40d-6c4438bbced2
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4cc9b022-436f-51a0-b40d-6c4438bbced2
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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