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Money versus Kudos: The Impact of Incentivizing Local Politicians in India

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dc.contributor.authorPalaniswamy, Nethra
dc.contributor.authorMansuri, Ghazala
dc.contributor.authorShrestha, Slesh A.
dc.contributor.authorRao, Vijayendra
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-20T17:25:04Z
dc.date.available2022-09-20T17:25:04Z
dc.date.issued2022-09
dc.description.abstractDespite growing awareness of the various limitations of electoral democracy, there is a relative lack of evidence on effective policy interventions to improve the performance of elected officials and motivate them to act more equitably. This paper reports the results from an experiment in which elected presidents of village governments in Tamil Nadu, India, were randomly assigned to one of two incentive schemes (or a control group): a financial incentive that rewarded better performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a nonfinancial incentive that awarded them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it. The findings show that both incentives improved access to public investments and private transfers in the villages of incentivized presidents. The nonfinancial incentive also led to a more equitable between-hamlet allocation of resources within the village, and this effect was more acute with officials who faced potentially more competitive elections. The paper shows that the results are consistent with a theoretical model where imperfect voter information drives inequities in resource allocation, and interventions that provide credible information on politician quality motivate elected representatives to act more equitably.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099524309192271907/IDU0df988a0107cf2041a508421047141c0e8943
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10186
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/38037
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Papers;10186
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectELECTED OFFICIALS
dc.subjectPERFORMANCE OF POLITICIANS
dc.subjectLOCAL GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectVILLAGE GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subjectFINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
dc.subjectELECTORAL DEMOCRACY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT FAILURE
dc.subjectINCENTIVIZING POLITICIANS
dc.subjectPANCHAYATS
dc.titleMoney versus Kudosen
dc.title.subtitleThe Impact of Incentivizing Local Politicians in Indiaen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleMoney versus Kudos: The Impact of Incentivizing Local Politicians in India
okr.date.disclosure2022-09-19
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:25:02.249452Z
okr.date.lastmodified2022-09-20T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePolicy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099524309192271907/IDU0df988a0107cf2041a508421047141c0e8943
okr.guid099524309192271907
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10186
okr.identifier.externaldocumentumIDU-df988a01-7cf2-41a5-8421-47141c0e8943
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum33900758
okr.identifier.reportWPS10186
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099524309192271907/pdf/IDU0df988a0107cf2041a508421047141c0e8943.pdfen
okr.region.countryIndia
okr.sectorOther Public Administration
okr.topicGovernance::Democratic Government
okr.topicGovernance::Local Government
okr.topicGovernance::Political Systems and Analysis
okr.topicGovernance::Regional Governance
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationb0d03fbb-dd7e-537c-8153-c916bfe24452
relation.isAuthorOfPublication385fa299-94e8-5dcc-a817-90cf574a0ae2
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery385fa299-94e8-5dcc-a817-90cf574a0ae2
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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