Publication:
Natural Openness and Good Government

dc.contributor.author Wei, Shang-Jin
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-27T21:06:50Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-27T21:06:50Z
dc.date.issued 2000-08
dc.description.abstract The author offers a possibly new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance, with a conceptual model and some empirical evidence. Assuming that corruption and bad governance reduce international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, a "naturally more open economy"-as determined by its size and geography-would devote more resources to building good institutions and would display less corruption in equilibrium. How is "natural openness" defined? By size, geography, and language. France would be more naturally open than Argentina because Argentina is more remote. Ability to speak English facilitates international trade. A country with a long coast tends to be more open than a landlocked country. In the data, "naturally more open economies" do show less corruption even after their level of development is taken into account. "Residual openness"-which could include trade policies-is not important once "natural openness" is accounted for. Moreover, "naturally more open economies" also tend to pay civil servants salaries that are more competitive with those of their private sector counterparts. One implication of this research is that globalization may affect governance: as globalization deepens, the "natural openness" of all countries increases. This raises the opportunity cost of tolerating a given level of corruption and could provide new impetus for countries to fight corruption. These patterns are consistent with the conceptual model. en
dc.identifier http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/443565/natural-openness-good-government
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19796
dc.language English
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2411
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject AVERAGE INCOME
dc.subject BAD GOVERNANCE
dc.subject BENCHMARK
dc.subject BILATERAL TRADE
dc.subject BRIBERY
dc.subject BUREAUCRACY
dc.subject BUREAUCRAT
dc.subject BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
dc.subject BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
dc.subject CIVIL RIGHTS
dc.subject CIVIL SERVANTS
dc.subject CIVIL SERVICE
dc.subject COMPETITIVENESS
dc.subject CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES
dc.subject CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
dc.subject CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
dc.subject CORRUPTION
dc.subject DEMOCRACY
dc.subject DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subject DIRECT INVESTMENT
dc.subject ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
dc.subject ECONOMIC RISK
dc.subject ECONOMICS LITERATURE
dc.subject EFFECT OF TRADE
dc.subject ELASTICITY
dc.subject EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subject EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subject EXPECTED UTILITY
dc.subject EXPENDITURE
dc.subject EXPORTS
dc.subject FEDERAL STATES
dc.subject FEDERALISM
dc.subject FIGHTING CORRUPTION
dc.subject FISCAL
dc.subject FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
dc.subject FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
dc.subject FOREIGN INVESTORS
dc.subject FOREIGN TRADE
dc.subject GDP
dc.subject GDP PER CAPITA
dc.subject GINI COEFFICIENT
dc.subject GOOD GOVERNANCE
dc.subject GOOD GOVERNMENT
dc.subject GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
dc.subject GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
dc.subject GOVERNMENT POLICIES
dc.subject GOVERNMENT REVENUES
dc.subject GROWTH RATE
dc.subject IMPORTS
dc.subject INCOME DISTRIBUTION
dc.subject INCOME EFFECT
dc.subject INCOME INEQUALITY
dc.subject INCOME LEVEL
dc.subject INEQUALITY
dc.subject INSTITUTION BUILDING
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL LABOR
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subject LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subject LOCAL GOVERNMENT
dc.subject LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
dc.subject LORENZ CURVE
dc.subject MARGINAL BENEFITS
dc.subject MARGINAL COST
dc.subject NATIONS
dc.subject OPEN ECONOMIES
dc.subject OPENNESS
dc.subject OPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subject OPTIMIZATION
dc.subject PER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subject POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject POLITICAL RIGHTS
dc.subject POLITICAL RISK
dc.subject PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
dc.subject PUBLIC INSTITUTION
dc.subject PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject PUBLIC POLICY
dc.subject PUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subject REVERSE CAUSALITY
dc.subject SOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subject TAX RATE
dc.subject TRADE BARRIERS
dc.subject TRADE POLICIES
dc.subject TRADING BLOCS
dc.subject TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject UTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subject VOTING
dc.subject WAGES
dc.title Natural Openness and Good Government en
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.date.disclosure 2000-08-31
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.docurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/443565/natural-openness-good-government
okr.globalpractice Poverty
okr.globalpractice Governance
okr.identifier.doi 10.1596/1813-9450-2411
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 000094946_00082205414670
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 443565
okr.identifier.report WPS2411
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/09/01/000094946_00082205414670/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf en
okr.sector Public Sector Management Adjustment
okr.sector Public Administration, Law, and Justice
okr.topic Economic Theory and Research
okr.topic Law and Development :: Legal Products
okr.topic Public Sector Development :: Decentralization
okr.topic Environmental Economics and Policies
okr.topic Poverty Monitoring and Analysis
okr.topic Governance :: National Governance
okr.topic Governance :: Governance Indicators
okr.topic Poverty Reduction
okr.unit Public Economics, Development Research Group
okr.volume 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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