Publication:
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism

dc.contributor.authorKeefer, Philip
dc.contributor.authorVlaicu, Razvan
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T17:57:15Z
dc.date.available2012-06-25T17:57:15Z
dc.date.issued2005-01
dc.description.abstractThe authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises; ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries -- patrons - who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. The authors also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short-run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3472
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectBENCHMARK
dc.subjectBENCHMARKS
dc.subjectBUREAUCRACY
dc.subjectCANDIDATES
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCIES
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectDIMINISHING RETURNS
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATES
dc.subjectECONOMIC BENEFITS
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectELECTION
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectELECTORAL COMPETITION
dc.subjectELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectELECTORAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEXOGENOUS SHOCKS
dc.subjectEXPENDITURES
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectINNOVATIONS
dc.subjectJURISDICTION
dc.subjectLEGISLATORS
dc.subjectORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectPOLICY INSTRUMENTS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPRIVATE GOODS
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
dc.subjectPUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC INVESTMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectRESOURCE ALLOCATION
dc.subjectTRANSPORTATION
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectVOTER PREFERENCES
dc.subjectVOTER REGISTRATION
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectWEALTH
dc.titleDemocracy, Credibility and Clientelismen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionareaJobs
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism
okr.globalpracticeSocial Protection and Labor
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3472
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000009486_20050202165259
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum5579805
okr.identifier.reportWPS3472
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/02/02/000009486_20050202165259/Rendered/PDF/wps3472.pdfen
okr.topicGovernance::Election Systems
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Decentralization
okr.topicEnvironmental Economics and Policies
okr.topicGovernance::Parliamentary Government
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Labor Policies
okr.topicGovernance::Politics and Government
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.unitResearch Support (DECRS)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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