Publication: Does "Good Government" Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining China's Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow
dc.contributor.author | Fan, Joseph P. H. | |
dc.contributor.author | Morck, Randall | |
dc.contributor.author | Xu, Lixin Colin | |
dc.contributor.author | Yeung, Bernard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-04T20:54:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-04T20:54:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | China is now the world's largest destination of foreign direct investment (FDI), despite assessments highlighting its institutional deficiencies. But this FDI inflow corresponds closely to predicted FDI flows into China from a model that predicts FDI inflow based on government quality indicators and controls and is estimated across a sample of other weak-institution countries. The only real discrepancy is that, if government quality is measured by constraints on executive power, China receives somewhat more FDI than the model predicts. This might reflect an underestimation of the strength of these constraints in China, a unique institutional setting for FDI operations, FDI based on expected future institutional improvements, or a unique Chinese model of development. The authors conclude that Ockham's razor disfavors the last. They also note that FDI may be elevated because Chinese institutions protect foreign firms better than domestic ones. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7537759/good-government-draw-foreign-capital-explaining-chinas-exceptional-foreign-direct-investment-inflow | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4206 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7062 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4206 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACTIONS | |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | BENCHMARK | |
dc.subject | BENCHMARKS | |
dc.subject | BUREAUCRACY | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL FLOWS | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL MARKET | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | CODES | |
dc.subject | CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS | |
dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES | |
dc.subject | CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | CROSS-COUNTRY DATA | |
dc.subject | DECISION MAKING | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
dc.subject | DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOW | |
dc.subject | DISCLOSURE | |
dc.subject | DOMESTIC FIRMS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC OUTCOMES | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC RESEARCH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIES OF SCALE | |
dc.subject | ELECTION | |
dc.subject | EMBEZZLEMENT | |
dc.subject | ETHICAL STANDARDS | |
dc.subject | EXCHANGE RATE | |
dc.subject | EXPROPRIATION | |
dc.subject | FDI | |
dc.subject | FIXED INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN FIRMS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN INVESTORS | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN OPERATION | |
dc.subject | FOREIGN OPERATIONS | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GDP PER CAPITA | |
dc.subject | GLOBAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | GROWTH POTENTIAL | |
dc.subject | GROWTH RATE | |
dc.subject | HOST COUNTRY | |
dc.subject | INEFFICIENCY | |
dc.subject | INFORMATION ASYMMETRY | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT PROJECTS | |
dc.subject | INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | LATIN AMERICAN | |
dc.subject | LEGAL PROTECTION | |
dc.subject | LEGAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMIC STABILITY | |
dc.subject | MANUFACTURING SECTORS | |
dc.subject | MARKET ACCESS | |
dc.subject | MARKET FAILURE | |
dc.subject | MASS MEDIA | |
dc.subject | MONARCHY | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | MULTINATIONAL FIRMS | |
dc.subject | NPV | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL DEBATE | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | PRIME MINISTER | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC INVESTMENT | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC POLICY | |
dc.subject | QUALITY OF LAWS | |
dc.subject | RULE OF LAW | |
dc.subject | RULINGS | |
dc.subject | TRANSPARENCY | |
dc.subject | TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO | |
dc.subject | WAGES | |
dc.title | Does "Good Government" Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining China's Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Does "Good Government" Draw Foreign Capital ? Explaining China's Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T07:18:03.129348Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7537759/good-government-draw-foreign-capital-explaining-chinas-exceptional-foreign-direct-investment-inflow | |
okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 212791468238142404 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4206 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000016406_20070413150536 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 7537759 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS4206 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/13/000016406_20070413150536/Rendered/PDF/wps4206.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | East Asia and Pacific | |
okr.region.country | China | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth::Investment and Investment Climate | |
okr.topic | Law and Development::Legal Products | |
okr.topic | Governance::Parliamentary Government | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Foreign Direct Investment | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
Files
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1