Publication:
Endogenous Institutions and Economic Policy

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dc.contributor.authorRobinson, James A.
dc.contributor.authorVostroknutov, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorVostroknutova, Ekaterina
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-21T15:44:24Z
dc.date.available2023-11-21T15:44:24Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-21
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a new framework to model institutions and institutional change. It shows how moral agents, who strive to cooperate with others, can form institutions that facilitate cooperation. The framework makes it possible to model informal as well as formal institutions as games played by moral agents: when the quality of the government is low and agents are not willing to use its services they will create informal institutions that allow them to cooperate outside the official channels. It is also possible to conceptualize institutions as inclusive or extractive and model institutional change as a consequence of the choice of moral agents among available institutions as time unfolds. With a series of examples of clientelistic networks, the paper shows that the framework can be useful for understanding how and why such networks form and persist. The framework can be used to model any interactions among moral agents, thus giving rise to a wide variety of possible institutional settings.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099828511082336962/IDU06226078f0057104ad308acd0b14a01eeba69
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10600
dc.identifier.urihttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/40636
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWorld Bank
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Papers; 10600
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectSOCIAL NORMS
dc.subjectINCLUSIVE AND EXTRACTIVE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectGROWTH
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL CHANGE POLICY
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL COOPERATON FRAMEWORK
dc.titleEndogenous Institutions and Economic Policyen
dc.typeWorking Paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleEndogenous Institutions and Economic Policy
okr.date.disclosure2023-11-08
okr.date.lastmodified2023-11-08T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePolicy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099828511082336962/IDU06226078f0057104ad308acd0b14a01eeba69
okr.guid099828511082336962
okr.identifier.docmidIDU-6226078f-0571-4ad3-8acd-b14a01eeba69
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10600
okr.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10600
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum34193594
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum34193594
okr.identifier.reportWPS10600
okr.import.id2352
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099828511082336962/pdf/IDU06226078f0057104ad308acd0b14a01eeba69.pdfen
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Growth
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance
okr.topicLaw and Development::Corruption & Anticorruption Law
okr.unitEFI-MTI-Global Macro and Debt (EMFMD)
relation.isAuthorOfPublication2e67c531-c715-5957-9736-c0da34b1ddb7
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery2e67c531-c715-5957-9736-c0da34b1ddb7
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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