Publication: Banking on Politics
| creativeworkseries.issn | 1564-698X | |
| dc.contributor.author | Braun, MatÃas | |
| dc.contributor.author | Raddatz, Claudio | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-08-30 | |
| dc.description.abstract | New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, public-interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns. | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | World Bank Economic Review | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/4521 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1564-698X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4521 | |
| dc.publisher | World Bank | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | World Bank Economic Review | |
| dc.rights | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo | |
| dc.subject | accountability | |
| dc.subject | accounting | |
| dc.subject | bank regulation | |
| dc.subject | banking regulation | |
| dc.subject | banking sector | |
| dc.subject | banking sector development | |
| dc.subject | banking system | |
| dc.subject | banks | |
| dc.subject | boards of directors | |
| dc.subject | capital requirements | |
| dc.subject | commercial banks | |
| dc.subject | financial regulation | |
| dc.subject | financial systems | |
| dc.subject | macroeconomics | |
| dc.subject | net interest margin | |
| dc.subject | private banks | |
| dc.subject | productivity | |
| dc.subject | profitability | |
| dc.subject | return on assets | |
| dc.subject | small banks | |
| dc.title | Banking on Politics | en |
| dc.title.alternative | When Former High-ranking Politicians Become Bank Directors | en |
| dc.type | Journal Article | en |
| dc.type | Article de journal | fr |
| dc.type | ArtÃculo de revista | es |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-05-06T11:23:03.912382Z | |
| okr.doctype | Journal Article | |
| okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
| okr.identifier.report | 2 | |
| okr.language.supported | en | |
| okr.pagenumber | 234 | |
| okr.pagenumber | 279 | |
| okr.pdfurl | wber_24_2_234.pdf | en |
| okr.peerreview | Academic Peer Review | |
| okr.region.administrative | Africa | |
| okr.region.administrative | Europe and Central Asia | |
| okr.region.administrative | Latin America & Caribbean | |
| okr.region.administrative | East Asia and Pacific | |
| okr.region.country | Brazil | |
| okr.region.country | Egypt, Arab Republic of | |
| okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
| okr.topic | Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures | |
| okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Access to Finance | |
| okr.volume | 24 | |
| relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication | a08aaed0-f62c-4b9d-98a9-78aa8da07fde | |
| relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | a08aaed0-f62c-4b9d-98a9-78aa8da07fde | |
| relation.isJournalOfPublication | c41eae2f-cf94-449d-86b7-f062aebe893f | |
| relation.isJournalVolumeOfPublication | 2ef03834-bd8f-430e-b7da-21defac3bcc7 |
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