Publication:
Taxation, Accountability, and Cash Transfers: Breaking the Resource Curse

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dc.contributor.authorDo, Quy-Toan
dc.contributor.authorDevarajan, Shantayanan
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-16T16:19:05Z
dc.date.available2021-12-16T16:19:05Z
dc.date.issued2021-12
dc.description.abstractWhy is governance in resource-rich countries so poor This paper argues that it is because governments in these countries do not rely on taxation, which is an important instrument for citizens to hold their governments accountable. Using a game-theoretic model, the authors show that the combination of low taxes and weak governance can be an equilibrium in an economy with sizeable mineral revenues. As income from natural resources ultimately declines, replacing it with tax revenues may require governments to give control of these proceeds to citizens, in the form of cash transfers say, as a credible commitment to accountability, thereby breaking the country out of its resource curse.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/152821639419544854/Taxation-Accountability-and-Cash-Transfers-Breaking-the-Resource-Curse
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-9880
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/36738
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 9880
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subjectNATURAL RESOURCE CURSE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectCREDIBLE COMMITMENT
dc.subjectCASH TRANSFERS
dc.subjectGAME THEORY
dc.titleTaxation, Accountability, and Cash Transfersen
dc.title.subtitleBreaking the Resource Curseen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleTaxation, Accountability, and Cash Transfers: Breaking the Resource Curse
okr.date.disclosure2021-12-13
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T10:12:10.247806Z
okr.date.lastmodified2021-12-16T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/152821639419544854/Taxation-Accountability-and-Cash-Transfers-Breaking-the-Resource-Curse
okr.guid152821639419544854
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-9880
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b088c1b031_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum33672557
okr.identifier.reportWPS9880
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/152821639419544854/pdf/Taxation-Accountability-and-Cash-Transfers-Breaking-the-Resource-Curse.pdfen
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Public Sector Economics
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Tax Policy
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Taxation & Subsidies
okr.topicPoverty Reduction::Services & Transfers to Poor
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group, Development Economics
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationddcdf87a-9a86-50e0-b365-0d2c747a0607
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryddcdf87a-9a86-50e0-b365-0d2c747a0607
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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