Publication:
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions?: Experimental Evidence from India

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dc.contributor.authorBrooks, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorHoff, Karla
dc.contributor.authorPandey, Priyanka
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-13T19:12:02Z
dc.date.available2016-10-13T19:12:02Z
dc.date.issued2016-09
dc.description.abstractExperiments in the United States have found that pairs of individuals are generally able to form socially efficient conventions in coordination games of common interest in a remarkably short time. This paper shows that this ability is not universal. The paper reports the results of a field experiment in India in which pairs of men from high and low castes repeatedly played a coordination game of common interest. Low-caste pairs overwhelmingly coordinated on the efficient equilibrium, consistent with earlier findings. In contrast, high-caste pairs coordinated on the efficient equilibrium at a much lower rate, with only 47 percent in efficient coordination in the final period of the experiment. The study traces the divergence in outcomes to how an individual responds to the low payoff he obtains when he attempts efficient coordination but his partner does not. After this event, high-caste men are significantly less likely than low-caste men to continue trying for efficiency. The limited ability to form the efficient convention can be explained by the framing effect of the culture of honor among high-caste men, which may lead them to interpret this event as a challenge to their honor, which triggers a retaliatory response.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-7829
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/25145
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 7829
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectculture
dc.subjecthonor
dc.subjectcaste
dc.subjectcoordination
dc.subjectconventions
dc.subjectframing
dc.subjectStag Hunt
dc.subjectlearning
dc.titleCan the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions?en
dc.title.subtitleExperimental Evidence from Indiaen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleCan the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? Experimental Evidence from India
okr.date.disclosure2016-09-20
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26799629/can-culture-honor-lead-inefficient-conventions-experimental-evidence-india
okr.guid157881474377387220
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-7829
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b0845998e8_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum26799629
okr.identifier.reportWPS7829
okr.importedtrue
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/09/20/090224b0845998e8/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Can0the0cultur00evidence0from0India.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeSouth Asia
okr.region.countryIndia
okr.topicGovernance::Local Government
okr.topicCulture and Development::Culture and Cultural Practice
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Economic Theory & Research
okr.unitMacroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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