Publication:
Protecting Who?: Optimal Social Protection Responses to Shocks with Limited Information

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dc.contributor.authorHernandez, Carlos Ospino
dc.contributor.authorRigolini, Jamele
dc.contributor.authorColl-Black, Sarah
dc.contributor.authorOviedo, Ana Maria
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-15T19:24:27Z
dc.date.available2023-06-15T19:24:27Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-15
dc.description.abstractThe literature on shock-responsive social protection focuses on operational features that improve the speed and reach of the response, but little is known about the optimal design of emergency social protection responses in terms of which programs to use, information about the people affected, and the extent of their losses. This paper studies optimal social protection responses to shocks, using microsimulations of different social assistance responses in Albania, Moldova, and North Macedonia. The paper shows that optimal design depends not only on the magnitude of the shock, but also on how the shock affects welfare rankings and on the parameters of the existing social assistance system, including the generosity of the schemes and how well they cover the poor. For given budgets, a universal transfer remains a suboptimal response. However, the extent to which existing programs should be expanded, as designed, to additional beneficiaries depends on the type of shock. When a shock tends to affect households homogeneously, increasing generosity and expanding the existing targeted social assistance program using established welfare metrics to assess eligibility is an effective response. When shocks affect households heterogeneously and bring some of them into extreme poverty, then pre-shock welfare indicators carry little information and policy makers should provide support through a new program or modified eligibility criteria, according to information on who suffered the shock. This analysis points to the importance of planning in advance for future crises and, within this, considering the optimal design of emergency social protection responses.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099739505302322963/IDU068267dbc008f50455709190070c789c65e11
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10461
dc.identifier.urihttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/39883
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Papers; 10461
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/igo/
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectSOCIAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectADAPTIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectDISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectCOVID-19 PANDEMIC
dc.subjectTARGETING
dc.subjectTARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION RESPONSE
dc.titleProtecting Who?en
dc.title.subtitleOptimal Social Protection Responses to Shocks with Limited Informationen
dc.typeWorking Paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleProtecting Who?: Optimal Social Protection Responses to Shocks with Limited Information
okr.date.disclosure2023-05-30
okr.date.lastmodified2023-05-30T00:00:00Zen
okr.doctypePolicy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099739505302322963/IDU068267dbc008f50455709190070c789c65e11
okr.guid099739505302322963
okr.identifier.docmidIDU-68267dbc-08f5-4557-9190-70c789c65e11
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-10461
okr.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10461
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum34071867
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum34071867
okr.identifier.reportWPS10461
okr.import.id843
okr.importedtrueen
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099739505302322963/pdf/IDU068267dbc008f50455709190070c789c65e11.pdfen
okr.region.administrativeEurope and Central Asia
okr.region.countryAlbania,Moldova,North Macedonia
okr.topicSocial Protections and Labor::Safety Nets and Transfers
okr.topicPoverty Reduction::Conditional Cash Transfers
okr.topicPoverty Reduction::Equity and Development
okr.unitHD - ECA Director (HECDR)
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationb51f7805-9174-58dc-a585-0ca1b7edbebc
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb51f7805-9174-58dc-a585-0ca1b7edbebc
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