Publication:
Seeds of Corruption : Do Market Institutions Matter?

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBroadman, Harry G.
dc.contributor.authorRecanatini, Francesca
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-28T18:26:04Z
dc.date.available2014-08-28T18:26:04Z
dc.date.issued2000-06
dc.description.abstractTen years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. The authors present an analytical framework for examining the role market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently available data on the incidence of corruption, and on institutional development, they provide preliminary evidence on the link between the development of market institutions, and incentives for corruption. Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to be important, but three are statistically significant: 1) the intensity of barriers to the entry of new business. 2) The effectiveness of the legal system. 3) The efficacy and competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure monopolies. The main lesson emerging from their analysis: a well established system of market institutions - clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances (including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust competitive environment - reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and hence incentives for corruption. Both the design, and effective implementation of such measures are important if a market system is to be effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate laws if they are not enforced. The local political economy greatly affects whether a given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially important are the following factors in the political economy: a) the credibility of the government's commitment to carrying out announced reforms. B) The degree to which government officials are captured by the entities they regulate or oversee. C) the stability of the government itself. D) The political power of entrenched vested interests. Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and "capture" of government officials. Only now are they becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437225/seeds-corruption-market-institutions-matter
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2368
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/19833
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 2368
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectACTIONS
dc.subjectALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
dc.subjectANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
dc.subjectASSET MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectAUTHORITY
dc.subjectBANKING SYSTEM
dc.subjectBANKRUPTCY
dc.subjectBARRIERS TO ENTRY
dc.subjectBUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
dc.subjectCABINET
dc.subjectCENTRAL PLANNING
dc.subjectCOLLUSION
dc.subjectCOMPETITION POLICY
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVENESS
dc.subjectCONFLICT OF INTERESTS
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectCONVENTIONAL WISDOM
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectCOURT PROCEDURES
dc.subjectCPI
dc.subjectDECISION-MAKING
dc.subjectDECREE
dc.subjectDEGREE OF CORRUPTION
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
dc.subjectDISCLOSURE
dc.subjectDISECONOMIES
dc.subjectDISECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC REGULATIONS
dc.subjectECONOMISTS
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subjectEMPIRICAL STUDIES
dc.subjectENACTMENT
dc.subjectETHICAL STANDARDS
dc.subjectFINANCIAL AUDITS
dc.subjectFINANCIAL CONTROL
dc.subjectFISCAL
dc.subjectFOREIGN COMPETITION
dc.subjectFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
dc.subjectFOREIGN INVESTORS
dc.subjectFOREIGN TRADE
dc.subjectFRAUD
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE REFORM
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE REFORMS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT AGENCIES
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT DECISION
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT EFFORTS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
dc.subjectHARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectIMPORTS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINDUSTRIALIZATION
dc.subjectINHERITANCE
dc.subjectINSOLVENCY
dc.subjectINSOLVENCY LAW
dc.subjectINSOLVENCY LAWS
dc.subjectINSOLVENT
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL REFORM
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subjectINVESTMENT CLIMATE
dc.subjectJUDICIARY
dc.subjectLAW INDEX
dc.subjectLEGAL FRAMEWORK
dc.subjectLEGAL SYSTEM
dc.subjectLEGISLATION
dc.subjectLEGISLATURE
dc.subjectLEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectLOCAL LEVELS
dc.subjectMARKET ECONOMY
dc.subjectMARKET POWER
dc.subjectMARKET PRICES
dc.subjectMERGERS
dc.subjectMERITOCRACY
dc.subjectMONOPOLIES
dc.subjectMONOPOLY
dc.subjectNATURAL MONOPOLY
dc.subjectOIL
dc.subjectOLIGOPOLY
dc.subjectPLANNED ECONOMIES
dc.subjectPOLICY INSTRUMENTS
dc.subjectPOLICY MAKERS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL POWER
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPREDATORY PRICING
dc.subjectPRICE FIXING
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectPRODUCERS
dc.subjectPUBLIC HEARINGS
dc.subjectPUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subjectQUOTAS
dc.subjectREGULATORY CAPTURE
dc.subjectREGULATORY OVERSIGHT
dc.subjectREGULATORY REGIME
dc.subjectREGULATORY REGIMES
dc.subjectREGULATORY SYSTEMS
dc.subjectRENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectREPRESENTATIVES
dc.subjectSOCIAL STABILITY
dc.subjectSOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectSTATE ENTERPRISES
dc.subjectSTATE OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectSTATE PROCUREMENT
dc.subjectSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
dc.subjectSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS
dc.subjectTAX ARREARS
dc.subjectTRANSITION ECONOMIES
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectUNOBSERVED COMPONENTS MODEL
dc.titleSeeds of Corruption : Do Market Institutions Matter?en
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleSeeds of Corruption: Do Market Institutions Matter?
okr.date.disclosure2000-06-30
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:41:14.863660Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437225/seeds-corruption-market-institutions-matter
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.guid792951468740699513
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-2368
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000094946_00070105313242
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum437225
okr.identifier.reportWPS2368
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/07/19/000094946_00070105313242/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdfen
okr.themePublic sector governance :: Other accountability/anti-corruption
okr.themeRule of law :: Legal institutions for a market economy
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicLaw and Development::Legal Products
okr.topicInternational Terrorism and Counterterrorism
okr.topicPublic Sector Development::Decentralization
okr.topicEnvironmental Economics and Policies
okr.topicGovernance::National Governance
okr.topicGovernance::Governance Indicators
okr.unitPoverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region
okr.volume1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Thumbnail Image
Name:
multi_page.pdf
Size:
6.18 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
multi_page.txt
Size:
97.05 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download
Collections
Policy Research Working Papers