Publication: Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms
dc.contributor.author | Wallsten, Scott | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-06T15:02:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-08-06T15:02:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | The question of the most effective order of reforming state-owned enterprises has been hotly debated over the years. In the early 1990s, many western advisers encouraged Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet Union, to privatize firms quickly under the assumption that market institutions would develop once firms were privately owned. The thinking since then has emphasized the importance of establishing an institutional framework conducive to promoting competition before privatizing firms. To date, there has been little empirical work clarifying the debate. The author attempts to address this gap, by examining the effects of the sequence of reform in telecommunications, particularly the effects of establishing a regulatory authority, prior to privatizing incumbent telecommunications firms. Consistent with current thinking, the author finds that countries that established separate regulatory authorities, prior to privatization, saw increased telecommunications investment, fixed telephone penetration, and cellular penetration compared with countries that did not. Moreover, he finds that investors are willing to pay more for telecommunications firms, in countries that established a regulatory authority before privatization. This increased willingness to pay is consistent with the hypothesis that investors require a risk premium to invest, where regulatory rules remain unclear. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1758948/sequencing-matter-regulation-privatization-telecommunications-reforms | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2817 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14813 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, D.C. | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No.2817 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ACCOUNTING | |
dc.subject | BIDDING | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVE MARKETS | |
dc.subject | CONSUMERS | |
dc.subject | DEREGULATION | |
dc.subject | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | |
dc.subject | EMPIRICAL STUDIES | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | EXOGENOUS VARIABLES | |
dc.subject | GDP | |
dc.subject | GDP PER CAPITA | |
dc.subject | INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS | |
dc.subject | MACROECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | MONOPOLY PROFITS | |
dc.subject | NATURAL MONOPOLIES | |
dc.subject | NATURAL MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | NETWORK EXTERNALITIES | |
dc.subject | NEW ENTRANTS | |
dc.subject | OPTIMIZATION | |
dc.subject | PER CAPITA INCOME | |
dc.subject | POSITIVE EFFECTS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE MONOPOLY | |
dc.subject | PRIVATIZATION | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC POLICY | |
dc.subject | REGULATOR | |
dc.subject | REGULATORS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY AGENCIES | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY AUTHORITY | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY CAPACITY | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY OBJECTIVES | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY REFORM | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY STRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | RISK PREMIUM | |
dc.subject | TELECOM SECTOR | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR | |
dc.subject | TELECOMS | |
dc.subject | TELEPHONE DENSITY | |
dc.subject | TELEPHONE PENETRATION | |
dc.subject | TELEPHONE SERVICE | |
dc.subject | TRADE LIBERALIZATION | |
dc.subject | TRANSPORT | |
dc.subject | UNIVERSAL SERVICE | |
dc.subject | VALUATION | |
dc.subject | VAN | |
dc.subject | WEALTH | |
dc.subject | WILLINGNESS TO PAY PRIVATIZATION | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATIONS | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | TRANSITION ECONOMIES | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTION BUILDING | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK | |
dc.subject | MARKET PENETRATION | |
dc.subject | COMPETITIVENESS | |
dc.subject | TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY | |
dc.subject | POLICY REFORM | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY BODIES | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY BODIES | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENTS | |
dc.subject | PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS | |
dc.subject | RISK PREMIUM | |
dc.subject | INVESTOR CONFIDENCE | |
dc.subject | REGULATORY STRUCTURE | |
dc.title | Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms | |
okr.date.doiregistration | 2025-04-10T09:40:00.739218Z | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1758948/sequencing-matter-regulation-privatization-telecommunications-reforms | |
okr.globalpractice | Transport and ICT | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Trade and Competitiveness | |
okr.guid | 284041468766823267 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-2817 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000094946_02041804272576 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 1758948 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS2817 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/05/03/000094946_02041804272576/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf | en |
okr.sector | Macro/Non-Trade | |
okr.topic | Economic Theory and Research | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | International Economics and Trade::Trade Finance and Investment | |
okr.topic | International Terrorism and Counterterrorism | |
okr.topic | Information and Communication Technologies::ICT Policy and Strategies | |
okr.topic | Administrative and Regulatory Law | |
okr.unit | Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP) | |
okr.volume | 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
Files
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1