Publication: On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
creativeworkseries.issn | 1564-698X | |
dc.contributor.author | MejÃa, Daniel | |
dc.contributor.author | Restrepo, Pascual | |
dc.contributor.author | Rozo, Sandra V. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-06T22:03:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-12-06T22:03:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-06-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. Our results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia. | en |
dc.identifier.citation | World Bank Economic Review | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1596/30965 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1564-698X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/30965 | |
dc.publisher | Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | World Bank Economic Review | |
dc.rights | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo | |
dc.subject | COCA CULTIVATION | |
dc.subject | AERIAL SPRAYING | |
dc.subject | LAW ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | ILLEGAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | INCENTIVES | |
dc.subject | PENALTIES | |
dc.subject | CRIME | |
dc.subject | ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES | |
dc.subject | ILLICIT DRUGS | |
dc.subject | WAR ON DRUGS | |
dc.title | On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets | en |
dc.title.subtitle | Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia | en |
dc.type | Journal Article | en |
dc.type | Article de journal | fr |
dc.type | ArtÃculo de revista | es |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crossref.title | On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2018-12-06 | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research::Journal Article | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1093/wber/lhv051 | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/30965 | |
okr.journal.nbpages | 570-94 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.peerreview | Academic Peer Review | |
okr.region.administrative | Latin America & Caribbean | |
okr.region.country | Colombia | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development::Anti-Money Laundering | |
okr.topic | Law and Development::Law Enforcement Systems | |
okr.topic | Social Development::Crime and Society | |
okr.volume | 31(2) | |
relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication | 360318ee-ff7c-4ba2-b188-bbc9febc1aae | |
relation.isJournalIssueOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 360318ee-ff7c-4ba2-b188-bbc9febc1aae | |
relation.isJournalOfPublication | c41eae2f-cf94-449d-86b7-f062aebe893f | |
relation.isJournalVolumeOfPublication | 8762f705-3f8b-491a-8613-25e8d1634b11 |